M 


George  Washington  Flowers 
Memorial  Collection 

DUKE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 


ESTABLISHED  BY  THE 
FAMILY  OF 

COLONEL  FLOWERS 


T  II  E      OFFICER'S      M  A  N  U  A  L. 


NAPOLP^ON'S 


MAXIMS  OF  WAR. 


RICHMOND,    VA.: 
VV  E  ST      à      J  0  n  N  S  T  0  N 
1862. 


KvANs  <fe  Cogswell.  Printers, 
No.  3  Broad  St..  Chaklksion.  S.  C. 


\i 


\ 


• 

it  -2.3 


E  E  C  O  M  MEND  A  T I O  N 


"  After  refreshing  my  memory  by  looking  over 
again  '  Tlie  Ofiicer's  Manual,'  or  '  Maxims  of  Napo- 
leon,' I  think  I  may  safely  recommend  the  republica- 
tion, in  America,  of  tlie  work  in  English,  as  likely  to 
be  called  for  by -many  officers,  regular  and  volunteer. 
It  contains  a  circle  of  maxim«!,  deduced  from  the 
highest  source  of  military  science  and  experience, 
with  practical  illustrations  of  the  principles  taken 
from  the  most  celebrated  campaigns  of  modern  times. 
The  study  of  the  book  cannot  fail  to  set  all  young 
officers  on  a  coursie  of  inquiry  and  reflection  greatly 
to  their  improvement. 

"WINFIKLD  SCOTT." 


\ 


PREFACE. 


The  publisher  has  reissued  this  little 
volume  as  a  publication  timely  for  the 
occasion.  A  collection  of  maxims  which 
directed  the  military  operations  of  the 
greatest  captain  of  modern  times,  cannot 
fail  to  prove  of  great  use  to  such  young 
officers  as  really  desire  a  knowledge  of 
the  art  of  war.  The  maxims  are  illus- 
trated hy  instances  drawn  from  the  cam- 
paigns of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Turenne, 
Frederick,  and  jN'apoleon.  These  great 
men  were  all  governed  by  the  same 
principles,  and  it  is  by  applying  these 
principles  to  the  perusal  of  their  respect- 
ive campaigns,  that  ever}^  military  man 
will  recognize  their  wisdom,  and  make 


6  PREFACE. 

such  use  of  them  hereafter  as  his  own 
particular  genius  shalk point  out. 

''And  here,  perhaps,"  says  the  trans- 
Lator,  CoL  D'Aguilar,  ''  my  task  might 
have  heen  considered  finished  ;  l)ut  per- 
ceiving how  ipxcomplete  the  collection 
was  alone,  I  have  endeavored  to  supply 
the  deficiency  hy  having  recourse  for 
further  illustration  to  the  memoirs  of 
MontecucuUi,  and  the  instructions  of 
Frederick  to  his  generals.  The  analogy 
of  their  principles  with  those  of  Napo- 
leon, has  convinced  me  that  the  art  of 
war  is  susceptible  of  two  points  of  view: 
one,  \^llich  relates  entirely  to  the  acquire- 
ments and  genius  of  the  general  ;  the 
other,  which  refers  to  matters  of  detail. 

"  The  first  is  the  same  in'  all  ages,  and 
with  all  nations,  whatever  he  the  arms 
with  which  they  fight.  Hence  it  follows 
that,  in  every  age,  great  commanders 
have  heen  governed  hy  the  same  princi- 
ples. 


PREFACE.  7 

"The  business  of  detail,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  controlled  by  existing  circum- 
stances. It  varies  with  the  character  of 
a  people,  and  the  quality  of  their  arms. 

"It  is  with  a  view  to  impress  the  jus- 
tice of  this  remark,  that  I  have  sought 
for  facts  in  difierent  periods  of  history, 
to  illustrate  these  maxims,  and  to  prove 
that  nothing  is  problematical  in  war  ;  but 
that  faihire  and  success  in  military  opera- 
tions depend  almost  always  on  the  natural 
genius  and  science  of  the  chief." 


NAPOLEON'S 

MAXIMS    OF    WAR. 


MAXIM   I. 


The  frontiers  of  states  are  either  hirge 
rivers,  or  chains  of  mountains,  or  deserts. 
OF  all  these  obstacles  to  the  march  of  an 
army,  the  most  difficult  to  overcome  is 
the  desert  ;  mountains  come  next,  and 
broad  fivers  occupy  the  third  place. 

NOTE. 

Napoleon,  in  his  military  c'areer,  appears 
to  have  been  called  upon  to  surmount  every 
difficult}'  which  can  occur  in  wars  of  inva- 
sion. 

In  Egypt  he  traversed  deserts,  and  van- 
quished and  destroyed  the  Mamelukes,  so 
celebrated  for  their  address  and  courage. 
His  genius  knew  how  to  accommodate  itself 
to  all  the  dangers  of  this  distant  enterprise; 


10  napoleon's 

in  a  country  ill  adapted  to  supply  the  avants 
of  his  troops. 

In  the  conquest  of  Ital}',  he  twice  crossed 
the  Alps  by  the  most  difficult  passes,  and  at 
a  season,  too,  which  rendered  this  undertak- 
inir  still  more  formidable.  In  three  months 
he  passed  the  Pyrenees,  defeated  and  dis- 
persed four  Spanish  armies.  In  short,  from 
the  Ehine  to  the  Borysthenes,  no  natural 
obstacle  could  be  found  to  arrest  the  rapid 
march  of  his  victorious  army. 


MAXIM    II. 

Ill  forming  the  plan  of  a  campaign,  it 
is  requisite  to  foresee  everytliing  the  ene- 
my may  do,  and  to  be  prepared  with  the 
necessary  means  to  counteract  it. 

Plans  of  campaign  may  be  modified 
ad  ùifinitum  according  to  circumstances — 
the  trenius  of  the  oreneral,  the  character 
of  the  troops,  and  the  topography  of  the 
theatre  of  action. 

N  o  T  E  .  • 

Sometimes  we  see  a  hazardous  campaign 

succeed,  the  plan  of  which  is  directly  at  va- 


f 

MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  11 

riance  with  the  priiiciplcs  of  the  art  of  war. 
But  this  success  depends  generally  on  the 
caprice  of  fortune,  or  upon  faults  committed 
by  the  enemy — two  things  upon  which  a  gen- 
eral must  never  count.  Sometimes  the  plan 
of  a  campaign,  although  based  on  sound 
principles  of  war,  runs  the  risk  of  failing  at 
the  outset  if  opposed  by  an  adversary  who 
acts  at  first  on  the  defensive,  and  then,  sud- 
denly seizing  the  initiative,  surprises  by  the 
skilfulness  of  his  manœuvres.  Such  was  the 
fate  of  the  plan  laid  down  by  the  Aulic  coun- 
cil for  the  campaign  of  179G,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Marshal  Wurmser.  From  his  great 
numerical  superiority,  the  marshal  had  calcu- 
lated on  the  entire  destruction  of  the  French 
army,  by  cutting  otf  its  retreat.  He  founded 
his  operations  on  the  defensive  attitude  of 
his  adversary,  who  was  posted  on  the  line 
of  the  Adige,  and  had  to  cover  the  siege  of 
Mantua,  as  well  as  central  and  lower  Italy. 
Wurmser,  supposing  the  French  army#x- 
ed  in  the  neighborhood  of  Mantua,  divided 
his  forces  into  three  corps,  which  marched 
separately,  intending  to  unite  at  that  place. 
I^apoleon,  having  penetrated  the  design  of 
the  Austrian  general,  perceived  the  advan- 
tage  to   be  derived  from   striking  the  first 


\%,  nai'olkon's 

blow  Ui^ainat  an  £11*1113-  divided  into  three 
corps,  witli  no  conimunicutiQn  between  tliem. 
île  hastened,  therefore,  to  raise  the  siege  of 
Mantua,  assembled  the  whole  of  his  forces, 
and  Ity  this  means  became  superior  to  tiie 
imperialists,  whose  divisions  he  attacked  and 
beat  in  detail.  Thus  Wurmser,  who  fancied 
he  had  onl}'  to  march  to  certain  victory, 
saw  himself  compelled,  after  ten  days  cam- 
paign, to  retire  with  the  remains  of  his  army 
into  the  Tyrol,  after  a  loss  of  twenty-tive 
thousand  men  in  killed  and  wounded,  fifteen 
thousand  prisoners,  nine  stand  of  colors,  and 
seventy  pieces  of  cannon. 

Hence,  nothing  is  so  difficult  as  to  pre- 
scribe beforehand  to  a  general  the  line  of 
conduct  he  shall  pursue  during  the  course 
of  a  campaign.  .Success  must  often  depend 
on  circumstances  that  cannot  be  foreseen > 
and  it  should  be  remembered,  likewise,  that 
nothing  cramps  so  much  the  efforts  of  genius 
as  (ijpmpelling  the  head  of  an  army  to  be 
governed  by  any  will  but  his  own. 


MAXIM    III. 

An   army  which  undertakes   the   cou- 
qiiost   of  a  country,  lias   its   two  wings 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  13 

resting  either  upon  neutral  territories,  or 
upon  great  natural  obstacles,  such  as  riv- 
ers or  chains  of  mountains.  It  happens 
in  some  cases  that  only  one  wing  is  so 
supported  ;  and  in  others  that  both  are 
exposed. 

In  the  first  instance  cited,  viz,,  where 
both  wings  are  protected,  a  geiieral  has 
only  to  protect  his  front  from  being  pene- 
trated. In  the  second,  where  one  wing 
«nly  is  supported,  he  should  rest  upon 
the  supported  wing.  In  the  third,  where 
both  wings  are  exposed,  he  should  depend 
upon  a  central  formation,  and  never  allow 
the  diiferent  corps  under  his  command  to 
depart  from  this:  for  if  it  be  difficult  to 
contend  w^ith  the  disadvantac^e  of  havins: 
two  flanks  exposed,  the  inconvenience  is 
doubled  by  having  four,  trebled  if  there 
be  six — that  is  to  say,  if  the  army  is  di- 
vided into  two  or  three  different  corps. 
In  the  first  instance,  then,  as  above  quot- 
ed, the  line  of  operation  maj^  rest  indif- 
ferently on  the  right  or  on  the  left„  In 
the  second,  it  should  be  directed  to^mrd 
the  wing  in  support.  In  the  thira;  it 
2 


14  napoleon's 

should  be  perpendicular  to  the  centre  of 
the  army's  line  of  march.  But  in  all 
these  cases  it  is  necessary,  at  a  distance 
vof  every  five  or  six  days  march,  to  have 
a  strong  post  or  an  entrenched  position 
upon  the  line  of  operation,  in  order  to 
collect  military  stores  and  provisions,  to 
organize  convoys,  to  form  of  it  a  centre 
of  movement,  and  establish  a  ponit  of 
defence  to  shorten  the  line  of  operation 
of  the  army.  • 

NOTE. 

These  general  principles  in  the  art  of  war 
were  entirely  unknown,  or  lost  sight  of,  in 
the  middle  ages.  The  crusaders  in  their  in- 
cursions into  Palestine  appear  to  have  had 
no  object  but  to  fight  and  to  conquer,  so  lit- 
tle pains  did  they  take  to  profit  by  their 
victories.  Hence,  innumerable  armies  per- 
ished in  Syria,  without  any  other  advan- 
taire  than  that  derived  from  the  momen- 
tar3^  success  obtained  by  superior  numbers. 

It  wiis  by  the  neglect  of  these  principles, 
also,  that  Charles  XII,  abandoning  his  line 
of  ^eration  and  all  communication  with 
Sweden,    threw    himself  into    the   Ukraine, 


MAXIMS    OP    WAR.  15 

find  lost  the  greater  part  of  his  army  by  the 
fatigue  of  a  winter  campaign  in  a  barren 
country  destitute  of  resources. 

Defeated  at  Pultawa,  lie  was  obliged  to 
seek  refuge  in  Turkey,  after  crossing  the 
Nieper  with  the  remains  of  his  army,  dimin- 
ished to  little  more  than  one  thousand  men. 

Gustavus  Adolphus  was  the  first  who 
brought  back  the  art  of  war  to  its'true  prin- 
ciples. His  operations  in  Germany  were 
bold,  rapid,  and  well  executed.  He  made 
success  at  all  times  conducive  to  future 
security,  and  established  his  line  of  opera- 
tion so  as  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  any 
interruption  in  his  communications  with 
Sweden.  His  campaigns  form  a  new  era  in 
the  art  of  war. 


MAXIM    lY. 

When  the  conquest  of  a  conutry  is 
undertaken  by  two  or  three  armies, 
wdiich  have  each  their  separate  line  of 
operation,  until  they  arrive  at  a  point 
fixed  upon  for  their  concentration,  it 
should  be  laid  down  as  a  principle,  that 


16  napoleon's 

the  union  of  these  different  corps  should 
never  take  phice  near  the  enemy  ;  be- 
cause the  enemy,  in  uniting  his  forces, 
may  not  onlj/  prevent  this  junction,  but 
may  beat  the  armies  in  detaiL 

NOTE. 

In  the  campaign  of  1757,  Frederick, 
marching  to  the  conquest  of  Bohemia  with 
two  armies,  which  had  each  their  separate 
hne  of  operation,  succeeded,  notwithstand- 
ing, in  uniting  them  in  sight  of  the  Duke 
of  Lorraine,,  who  covered  Prague  with  the 
imperial  army  ;  hut  his  example  should  not 
be  followed.  The  success  of  this  march 
depended  entirely  on  the  inaction  of  the 
duke,  who,  at  the  head  of  seventy  thousand 
men,  did  nothing  to  prevent  the  junction  of 
the  two  Prussian  armies. 


MAXIM    V. 

All  Tvai-s  should  be  governed  by  certain 
principles,  for  every  war  should  have  a 
definite  object,  and  be  conducted  accord- 
ing to  the  rules  of  art.     (A  w^ar  should 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  17 

only  be  undertaken  with  forces  propor- 
tioned to  the  obstacles  to  be  overcome.) 

NOTE. 

It  was  a  saying  of  Marshal  Yillars,  that 
when  war  is  decided  on,  it  is  necessary  to 
have  exact  information  of  the  nunibcr  of 
troops  the  enemy  can  bring  into  the  field, 
since  it  is  impossible  to  lay  down  any  solid 
plan  of  offensive  or  defensive  operation  . 
without  an  accurate  knowledge  of  what 
you  have  to  expect  and  fear.  "When  the 
first  shot  is  fired/'  observes  Marshal  Villars, 
^'  no  one  can  calculate  what  will  be  the  is- 
sue of  the  war.  It  is,  therefore,  of  vast 
importance  to  reflect  maturely  before  we 
begin  it."  When  once,  however,  this  is 
decided,  the  marshal  observes  that  the  bold- 
est and  most  extended  plans  are  generally 
the  wisest  and  the  most  successfuL  '^Whert 
we  are  determined  upon  war,"  he  adds,  '^we 
should  carry  it  on  vigorously  and  without 
trifling." 


MAXIM    VI. 

At  the  commencement  of  a  campaign, 
to  advance  or  not  to  aâ^vance,  is  a  matter 


18  napoleon's 

for  grave  consideration  ;  but  wlien  once 
the  offensive  has  been  assumed,  it  must 
be  sustained  to  the  last  extremity.  How- 
ever skilful  the  manœuvres  in  a  retreat, 
it  will  always  weaken  the  morale  of  an 
army,  because,  in  losing  the  chances  of 
success,  these  last  are  transferred  to  tbe 
enemy.  Besides,  retreats  always  cost 
more  men  and  materiel  than  the  most 
blood}^  engagements  ;  with  this  differ- 
ence, that  in  a  battle  the  enemy's  loss  is 
nearly  equal  to  your  own — whereas  in  a 
retreat  tlie  loss  is  on  your  side  only. 

note; 

Marshal  Saxe  remarks,  that  no  retreats 
are  so  favorable  as  those  which  are  made 
before  a  languid  and  unenterprising  enemy, 
for  when  he  pursues  with  vigor,  the  retreat 
soon  degenerates  into  a  rout.  "Upon  this 
principle  it  is  a  great  error,"  says  the 
marshal,  ''  to  adhere  to  the  proverb  which 
recommends  us  to  build  a  bridge  of  gold  for 
a  retreating  enemy.  No;  follow  him  up 
with  spirit,  and  he  is  destroyed  !" 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  19 


MAXIM  y  1 1. 


An  army  should  be  ready  every  day, 
every  night,  and  at  all  times  of  the  day 
and  niglit,  to  oppose  all  the  resistance 
of  which  it  is  capable.  With  this  view, 
the  soldier  should  always  be  furnished 
completely  with  arms  and  ammunition; 
the  infantry  should  never  be  without  its 
artiller}^  its  cavalry,  and  its  generals  ; 
and  the  différent  divisions  of  the  army 
should  be  constantly  in  a  state  to  sup- 
port, to  be  supported,  and  to  protect 
itself. 

The  troops,  whether  halted,  or  en- 
camped, or  on  the  march,  should  be 
always  in  favorable  positions,  possesvsing 
the  essentials  req-uired  for  a  field  of  bat- 
tle; for  example,  the  flanks  should  be 
well  covered,  and  all  the  artillery  so 
placed  as  to  have  free  range,  and  to  play 
with  the  greatest  advantage.  When  an 
army  is  in  column  of  march,  it  should 
have  advanced  guards  and  flanking,  par- 
ties, to  examine  well  the  countrv  in  front, 
to  the  right,  and  to  the  left,  and  always 


r 

20  napoleon's 

at  such  distance  as  to  enable   the  main 
body  to  deploy  into  position. 

NOTE. 

The  following  maxims,  taken  from  the 
memoirs  of  Montécuculli,  appear  to  me  well 
suited  to  this  place,  and  calculated  to  form  a 
useful  commentary  on  the  general  principles 
laid  down  in  the  preceding  maxim  : 

'  1.  When  war  has  been  once  decided  on, 
the  moment  is  past  for  doubts  and  scruples. 
On  the  contrary,  we  are  bound  to  hope  that 
all  the  evil  which  may  ensue,  will  not;  that 
Providence,  or  our  own  wisdom,  may  avert 
it;  or  that  the  want  of  talent  on  the  part  of 
the  enemy  may  prevent  him  from  benefiting 
by  it.  The  first  security  for  success  is  to 
confer  the  command  on  one  individual. 
When  the  authority  is  divided,  the  opinions 
of  the  commanders  often  vary,  and  the  ope- 
rations are  deprived  of  that  ensemble,  which 
is  the  first  essential  to  victory.  Besides, 
when  an  enterprise  is  common  to  man}^,  and 
not  confined  to  a  single  person,  it  is  con- 
ducted without  vigor,  and  less  interest  is 
attached  to  the  result. 

After  having  strictly  conformed  to  all  the 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  21 

rules  of  war,   and    satisfied    ourselves   tliat 
nothing  lias  been  omitted  to  ensure  eventual 
success,  w^e  must  then  leave  the  issue  in  the 
hands  of  Providence,  and  repose   ourselves 
tranquilly  in  the  decision  of  a  higher  power. 
Let  what  will  arrive,  it  is  the  part  of  a 
general-in-chief  to  remain  firm  and  constant 
in  his  purposes;  he  must  not  allow  himself 
to  be  elated   by  prosperity,  nor  to   be  de- 
pressed by  adversity:  for  in  war  good  and 
bad  and  fortune  succeed  each  other  by  turns, 
form  the  ebb  and  flow  of  military  operations. 
2.  When  your  own    army  is   strong   and 
inured  to  service,  and  that  of  the  enemy  is 
weak  and  consists  of  new  levies,  or  of  troops 
enervated  by  long  inaction,  then  you  should 
exert  every  means  to  bring  him  to  battle. 

If;  on  the  other  hand,  your  adversary  has 
the  advantage  in  troops,  a  decisive  combat 
is  to  be  avoided,  and  you  must  be  content  to 
impede  his  progress,  by  encamping  advan- 
tageously, and  fortifying  ûivorable  passes. 
When  armies  are  nearly  equal  in  force,  it  is 
desirable  not  to  avoid  a  battle,  but  only  to 
attempt  to  fight  one  to  advantage.  For  this 
purpose,  care  should  be  taken  to  encamp  al- 
ways in  front  of  the  enemy;  to  move  when 
he  moves,  and  occupy  the  heights  and  ad- 


22  napoleon's 

vantageoiis  grounds  that  lie  upon  his  line  of 
march  ;  to  seize  upon  all  the  buildings  and 
roads  adjoining  to  his  camp,  and  post  your- 
self advantageously  in  the  places  by  which 
he  vtiust  pass.  It  is  always  something  gain- 
ed to  make  him  lose  time,  to  thwart  his  de- 
signs, or  to  retard  their  progress  and  exe- 
cution. If,  however,  an  army  is  altogether 
inferior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and  there  is  no 
possibility  of  manœuvring  against  him  with 
success,  then  the  campaign  must  be  aban- 
doned, and  the  troops  must  retire  into  the 
fortresses. 

3.  The  principal  object  of  a  general-in- 
chief,  in  the  moment  of  battle,  should  be  to 
secure  the  flanks  of  his  army.  It  is  true 
that  natural  positions  may  be  found  to  effect 
this  object,  but  these  positions  being  fixed 
and  immovable  in  themselves,  they  are  only 
advantageous  to  a  general  who  wishes  to 
w^ait  the  shock  of  the  enemj^,  and  not  to  one 
wlio  marches  to  the  attack. 

A  general  can,  therefore,  rely  only  on  the 
proper  arrangement  of  his  troops,  to  enable 
him  to  repel  any  attempt  the  adversary  may 
make  upon  the  front,  or  flanks,  or  rear  of 
his  army. 

If  one  flank  of  an  army  rests  upon  a  river, 


MAXIMS   or   WAR.  23 

or  an  impassable  ravine,  the  whole  of  the 
cavalry  may  be  posted  with  the  other  wing, 
in  order  to  envelop  the  enemy  more  easily 
by  its  superiority  in  numbers. 

If  the  enemy  has  his  flanks  supported  by 
woods,  light  cavalry  or  infantry  should  be 
despatched  to  attack  him  in  flank  or  in  rear 
during  the  heat  of  the  battle.  If  practica- 
ble, also,  an  attack  should  be  made  upon  the 
baggage,  to  add  to  his  confusion. 

If  you  desire  to  beat  the  enemy's  left  with 
your   right   wing,   or   his   right   with   your 
left  wing,  the  wing  with  which  you  attack 
should  be   reinforced    by   the    élite  of  your 
army.     At  the  same  moment,  the  other  wino- 
should  avoid  battle,  and  the  attacking  wing 
brought  rapidly  forward,  so  as  to  overwhelm 
the  enemy.     If  the  nature   of  the   ground 
admits,  he  should  be  approached  by  stealth, 
and  attacked  before  he  is  on  his  guard.     If 
any  signs  of  fear  are  discoverable  Tn  the  en- 
emy, and  which  are  always  to  be  detected 
by  confusion  or  disorder  in  his  movements, 
he  should  be  pursued  immediately,  without 
allowing  him  time  to  recover  himself     It  is 
now  the  cavalry  should  be  brought  into  ac- 
tion, and  manoeuvre  so  as  to   sui-prise  and 
cut  off  his  artillery  and  bamrao-e. 


*&ô"6' 


24  nap.oleon's 

4.  The  order  of  march  should  always  be 
subservient  to  the  order  of  battle,  which  last 
should  be  arranged  beforehand.  The  march 
of  an  army  is  always  w^ell  regulated  when  it 
is  governed  by  the  distance  to  be  accom- 
plished, and  by  the  time  required  for  its  per- 
formance. The  front  of  the  column  of  march 
should  be  diminished  or  increased  according 
to  the  nature  of  the  country,  taking  care 
that  the  artillery  always  proceeds  by  the 
main  road. 

When  a  river  is  to  be  passed,  the  artillery 
should  be  placed  in  battery  upon  the  bank 
opposite  the  point  of  crossing. 

It  is  a  great  advantage,  when  a  river 
forms  a  sweep  or  angle,  and  when  a  ford  is 
to  be  found  near  the  place  where  you  wish 
to  effect  a  passage.  As  the  construction  of 
the  bridge  proceeds,  infantry  should  be  ad- 
vanced to  cover  the  workmen,  by  keeping 
up  a  fire  on  the  opposite  bank  ;  but  the  mo- 
ment it  is  finished,  a  corps  of  infantry  and 
cavalry,  and  some  field-pieces,  should  be 
pushed  across.  The  infantry  should  entrench 
itself  immediately  at  the  head  of  the  bridge, 
and  it  is  prudent,  moreover,  to  fortify  on  the 
same  side  of  the  river,  in  order  to  protect 
the  bridfice  in  case  the  enemv  should  venture 
an' offensive  movement. 


I  '  MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  25 

The  advanced  guard  of  an  ami)'  should 
be  always  provided  with  trusty  guides,  and 
witli  a  corps  of  pioneers  :  the  first  to  point 
out  the  best  roads,  the  second  to  render 
these  roads  more  practicable. 

If  the  army  marches  in  detachments,  tlic 
commander  of  each  detachment  should  be 
furnished  with  the  name  of  the  place  in 
writing,  where  the  whole  are  to  be  reassem- 
bled ;  the  place  should  be  sufficiently  re- 
moved from  the  enemy  to  prevent  him  from 
occupying  it  before  the  junction  of  all  the 
detachments.  To  this  end,  it  is  of  import- 
ance to  keep  the  name  a  secret. 

From  the  moment  an  army  approaches 
the  enemy,  it  should  march  in  the  order  in 
which  it  is  intended  to  nght.  If  anything  is 
to  be  apprehended,  precautions  are  necessary 
in  proportion  to  the  degree  of  the  danger. 
When  a  defile  is  to  be  passed,  the  troops 
should  be  halted  beyond  the  extremity,  until 
the  whole  army  has  quitted  the  defile. 

In  order  to  conceal  the  movements  of  an 
army,  it  is  necessary  to  march  by  night 
through  woods  and  valleys,  by  the  most  re- 
tired roads,  and  out  of  reach  of  all  inhabited 
places.  JNo  fires  should  be  allowed;  and,  to 
favor  the  design  still  more,  the  troops  should 
3 


26  napoleon's 

move  by  verbal  order.  When  the  object  of 
the  march  is  to  carry  a  post,  or  to  relieve  a 
place  that  is  besieged,  the  advanced  guard 
should  march  within  musket  shot  of  the 
main  body,  because  then  you  are  prepared 
for  an  immediate  attack,  and  ready  to  over- 
throw all  before  you. 

When  a  march  is  made  to  force  a  pass 
guarded  by  the  enemy,  it  is  desirable  to 
make  a  feint  upon  one  point,  while,  by  a 
rapid  movement,  you  bring  your  real  attack 
to  bear  upon  another. 

Sometimes  success  is  obtained  by  pretend- 
ing to  fall  back  upon  the  original  line  of 
march,  and,  by  a  sudden  countermarch,  seiz- 
ing upon  the  pass,  before  the  enemy  is  able 
to  reoccupy  it.  Some  generals  have  gained 
their  point  by  manœuvring  so  as  to  deceive 
the  enemy,  while  a  detachment  under  the 
cover  of  high  grounds  has  surprised  the  pas- 
sage by  a  stolen  march.  The  enemy  being 
ensraired  in  watchino-  the  movements  of  the 
main  body,  the  detachment  has  an  opportu- 
nity of  entrenching  itself  in  its  new  position. 

5.  An  army  regulates  its  mode  of  enamp- 
ment  according  to  the  greater  or  less  degree 
of  precaution,  when  circumstances  require. 
In  a  friendly  country  the  troops  are  divided, 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  27 


to  afford  better  accommodation  and  supplies. 
But  with  the  enemy  in  front,  an  arm)'  should 
always  encamp  in  order  of  battle.  With 
this  view,  it  is  oi  the  highest  importance  to 
cover  one  part  of  the  camp,  as  far  as  practi- 
cable, by  natural  defences,  such  as  a  river,  a 
chain, of  rocks,  or  a  ravine.  Care  should  be 
taken  also  that  the  camp  is  not  commanded, 
and  that  there  is  no  obstacle  to  a  free  com- 
munication between  the  different  corps,  and 
which  can  prevent  the  troops  from  mutually 
succoring  each  other. 

When  an  army  occupies  a  fixed  camp,  it  is 
necessary  to  be  well  supplied  with  provisions 
and  ammunition,  or  at  least  that  these  should 
be  within  certain  reach  and  easily  obtained. 
To  insure  this,  the  line  of  communication 
must  be  well  establislied,  and  care  taken  not 
to  leave  an  enemy's  fortress  in  your  rear. 

When  an  army  is  established  in  winter 
quarters,  its  safety  is  best  secured  either  by 
fortifying  a  camp  (for  which  purpose  a  spot 
should  be  selected  near  a  large  commercial 
town,  or  a  river  affording  facility  of  trans- 
port\  or  by  distributing  it  in  close  canton- 
ments, so  that  the  troops  should  be  near 
together,  and  capable  of  affording  each  other 
mutual  support. 


28  .       napoleon's  ' 

The  winter  quarters  of  an  army  should  be 
protected,  likewise,  by  constructing  small 
covered  works  on  all  the  lines  of  approach 
to  the  cantonments,  and  by  posting  advanced 
guards  of  cavalry  to  observe  the  motions  of 
the  enemy. 

6.  A  battle  is  to  be  sought,  when  there  is 
reason  to  hope  for  victory,  or  when  an  army 
runs  the  risk  of  being  ruined  without  light- 
ing; also  when  a  besieged  place  is  to  be 
relieved,  or  when  you  desire  to  prevent 
a  reinforcement  from  reaching  the  enemy. 
Battles  are  useful,  likewise,  when  we  wish 
to  profit  by  a  favorable  opportunity  which 
offers,  to  secure  a  certain  advantage,  such  as 
seizing  upon  an  undefended  point  or  pass, 
attacking  the  enemy  when  he  has  commit- 
ted a  fault,  or  when  some  misiinderstanding 
among  his  generals  favors  the  undertaking. 

If  an  enemy  declines  an  engagement,  he 
may  be  compelled  to  it,  either  by  besieging 
a  place  of  importance,  or  by  falling  upon 
him  unawares,  and  when  he  cannot  easily 
effect  his  retreat.  Or  (after  pretending  to 
retire),  by  making  a  rapid  countermarch, 
attacking  him  vigorousl}^  and  forcing  him  to 
action. 

The  different  circumstances  under  wdiich 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  29 

a  battle  should  be  avoided  or  declined,  are, 
when  there  is  greater  danger  to  be  a])pre- 
hended  from  defeat  than  advantage  to  be 
derived  from  victory;  when  you  are  very 
inferior  to  your  adversary  in  numbers,  and 
are  expecting  reinforcements;  above  all, 
when  the  enemy  is  advantageously  posted, 
or  when  he  is  contributing  to  his  own  ruin 
by  some  inherent  defect  in  his  position,  or 
by  the  erroi*s  and  divisions  of  his  generals. 

To  gain  a  battle,  each  arm  must  be  ad- 
vantageously posted,  and  have  the  means 
of  engaging  its  front  and  in  flank.  The 
wings  must  be  protected  by  natural  obsta- 
cles, where  these  present  themselves,  or  by 
having  recourse  when  necessary  to  the  aid 
of  art. 

The  troops  must  be  able  to  assist  each 
other  without  confusion,  and  care  must  be 
taken  that  the  broken  corps  do  not  fall 
back  upon,  and  throw  the  rest  into  dis- 
order. Above  all,  the  intei-^^als  between 
the  different  coi-ps  must  be  sufficiently  small 
to  prevent  the  enemy  ft*om  penetrating  be- 
tween them,  for  in  that  case  you  would  be 
obliged  to  employ  your  reserves,  and  run 
the  risk  of  being  entirely  overwhelmed. 
Sometimes  victory  is  obtained   by  creating 


30  napoleon's 

a  diversion  in  the  middle  of  a  battle,  or 
even  by  depriving  the  soldier  of  all  hope 
of  retreat,  and  placing  him  in  a  situation 
where  he  is  reduced  to  the  necessity  either 
to  conquer  or  die. 

At  the  commencement  of  a  battle,  if  the 
ground  is  level,  you  should  advance  to  meet 
the  enemy,  in  order  to  inspire  the  soldier 
with  courage  ;  but  if  you  are  well  posted, 
and  your  artillery  advantageously  placed, 
then  wait  for  him  with  determination  :  re- 
membering always  to  fight  resolutelj^,  to 
succor  oj^portunely  those  who  require  it, 
and  never  to  bring  your  reserves  into  ac- 
Iton  exce^it  m  the  last  extremity;  and 
even  then  to  preserve  some  support,  be- 
hind which  the  broken  corps  may  i*ally. 

When  it  is  necessary  to  attack  with  your 
whole  force,  the  battle  should  commence 
toward  evening;  because  then,  Avhatever 
be  the  issue,  night  will  arrive  to  separate 
the  combatants  before  your  troops  are  ex- 
hausted. By  this  means,  an  opportunity 
is  afforded  of  affecting  an  orderly  retreat 
if  the  result  of  the  battle  requires  it. 

During  an  action,  the  general -in -chief 
should  occupy  some  spot  whence  he  can, 
as  lar  as  possible,  overlook  his  whole  army. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  31 

He  should  be  informed,  immediately,  of 
everything  that  passes  in  the  different 
divisions.  He  should  be  ready,  in  order  to 
render  success  more  complete,  to  operate 
with  fresh  troops  upon  those  points  whero 
the  enemy  is  giving  way,  and  also  to  rein- 
force hi''  own  corps  wherever  they  are  in- 
clined to  yield.  AVhen  the  enemy  is  beat- 
en, he  must  pursue  him  instantly,  without 
giving  him  a  moment  to  rally  ;  on  tlie 
other  hand,  if  he  is  himself  defeated,  or 
despairs  of  victory,  he  must  retreat  in  the 
best  possible  order. 

7.  It  shows  great  talent  in  a  general 
to  bring  troops,  who  are  prepared  for  ac- 
tion, into  collision  with  those  who  are 
not  :  for  example,  fresh  troops  against  those 
which  are  exhausted — brave  and  disciplined 
men  against  recruits.  He  must  likewise  be 
ready  always  to  fall  with  his  army  upon 
a  weak  or  detached  corps,  to  follow  the 
track  of  the  enemy,  and  charge  hinl^  among 
defiles  before  he  can  face  about  and  get  into 
position. 

8.  A  position  is  good  when  the  difï'crent 
corps  are  so  placed  as  to  be  engaged  with 
advantage,  and  without  any  remaining  un- 
employed.    If  you  are  superior  in  cavalry. 


32  napoleon's 

positions  are  to  be  taken  in  plains  and 
open  ground  ;  if  in  infantry,  in  an  enclos- 
ed and  covered  country.  If  inferior  in 
numbers,  in  confined  and  narrow  places  • 
if  superior,  in  a  spacious  and  entensive 
field.  AYitli  a  very  inferior  army,  a  diffi- 
cult pass  must  be  selected  to  occupy  and 
fortify. 

9.  In  order  to  obtain  every  possible  ad- 
vantage from  a  diversion,  we  should  ascer- 
tain first,  that  the  country  in  which  it  is  to 
be  created  is  easily  penetrated.  A  diversion 
should  be  made  vigorously,  and  on  those 
points  where  it  is  calculated  to  do  the  great- 
est mischief  to  the  enemy. 

10.  To  make  war  with  success,  the  follow- 
ing principles  should  never  be  departed 
from  : 

To  be  superior  to  your  enemy  in  numbers, 
as  well  as  in  morale  ;  to  fight  battles  in  order 
to  spread  terror  in  the  country;  to  divide 
your  army  into  as  many  corps  as  may  be 
effected  without  risk,  in  order  to  undertake 
several  objects  at  the  same  time  ;  to  treat 
WEJ,L  those  who  yield,  to  ill  treat  those  who 
resist  ;  to  secure  your  rear,  and  occupy  and 
strengthen  yourself  at  the  outset  in  some 
post  which  shall  serve  as  a  central  point  for 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  33 

the  support  of  your  future  movements  ;  to 
guard  aojainst  desertion  ;  to  make  ^^ourself 
master  of  the  great  rivers  and  principal 
passes,  and  to  establish  your  line  of  commu- 
nication by  getting  possession  of  the  for- 
tresses, by  laying  siege  to  them,  and  of  the 
open  country,  by  giving  battle;  for  it  is  vain 
to  expect  that  conquests  are  to  be  achieved 
without  combats;  although  when  a  victory 
is  won,  they  will  be  best  maintained  by 
uniting  mildness  with  valor. 


MAXI/M    Y I II. 

A  general -in -chief  should  ask  himself 
frequently  iu  the  day:  "What  should  I 
do  if  the  enemy's  army  appeared  now  in 
my  front,  or  on  ni}^  I'ight,  or  my  left?" 
If  he  have  any  difficulty  in  answ^ering 
these  questions,  his  position  is  bad,  and 
he  should  seek  to  remedy  it. 


NOTE, 


In  the  campaign  of  1758,  the  position  of 
the  Prussian  army  at  Hohen  Kirk,  being 
commanded  by  the  batteries  of  the  enemy, 
w4io  occupied  all  the  heights,  was  eminently 


34  napoleon's 

defective;  notwithstanding,  Frederick,  who 
saw  his  rear  menaced  by  the  corps  of  Laudon, 
remained  six  days  in  his  camp  without  seek- 
ing to  correct  his  position.  It  would  seem, 
indeed,  that  he  was  ignorant. of  his  real  dan- 
ger: for  Marshal  Daun,  having  manoeuvred 
during  the  night  in  order  to  attack  by  day- 
break, surprised  the  Prussians  in  their  lines 
before  they  were  able  to  defend  themselves, 
and  by  this  means  surrounded  them  com- 
pletely. 

Frederick  succeeded,  however,  in  effecting 
his  retreat  with  regularity,  but  not  Avithout 
the  loss  of  ten  thousand  men,  manj^  general 
officers,  and  almost  all  of  his  artillery.  If 
Marshal  Daun  had  foUow^ed  up  his  victorj^ 
with  greater  boldness,  the  king  of  Prussia 
would  never  have  been  able  to  rally  his 
army.  On  this  occasion,  Frederick's  good 
fortune  balanced  his  imprudence. 

Marshal  Saxe  remarks,  that  there  is  more 
talent  than  is  dreamt  of  in  bad  dispositions, 
if  w^e  possess  the  art  of  converting  them  in. 
to  good  ones  when  the  favorable  moment 
arrives.  Nothing  astonishes  the  enemy  so 
much  as  this  manœuvre;  he  has  counted 
upon  something  ;  all  his  arrangements  have 
been  founded  upon  it  accordingly^ — and  at 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  35 

the  momoiit  of  attack  it  escaj:)es  him  !  '-  I 
must  repeat,"  says  the  marshal,  '^  there  is 
nothing  that  so  Completel}'  disconcerts  an 
enemy  as  this,  or  leads  him  to  commit  so 
many  errors;  for  it  follows,  that  if  he  does 
not  change  his  arrangements,  he  is  beaten  ; 
and  if  he  does  change  them,  in  presence  of 
his  adversary,  he  is  equally  undone." 

It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  a  general 
who  should  rest  the  success  of  a  battle  upon 
such  a  principle,  would  be  more  likely  to 
lose  than  to  gain  by  it  -,  for  if  he  had  to  deal 
with  a  skilful  adversary  and  an  alert  tac- 
tician, the  latter  would  find  time  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  previous  bad  arrangements, 
before  he  would  be  able  to  remedy  them. 


MAXIM    IX. 

The  strength  of  an  army,  like  the 
power  in  mechanics,  is  estimated  by  mul- 
tiplying the  mass  by  the  rapidity;  a  rapid 
march  augments  the  anorak  of  an  army, 
and  increases  its  means  of  victory.  Press 
on  ! 


36  napoleon's 


NOTE. 

"  Eapidity,"  says  Montécuciilli,  ''  is  of  im- 
portance in  concealing  the  movements  of  an 
army,  because  it  leaves  no  time  to  divulge 
the  intention  of  its  chief  It  is,  therefore, 
an  advantage  to  attack  the  enemy  unexpec- 
tedly, to  take  him  off  his  guard,  to  surprise 
him,  and  let  him  feel  the  thunder  before  he 
sees  the  flash  ;  but  if  too  great  celerity  ex- 
hausts your  troops,  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
delay  deprives  you  of  the  fiivorable  moment, 
you  must  weigh  the  advantage  against  the 
disadvantage,  and  choose  between." 

Marshal  Yillars  observes,  that  ^'  in  war 
everything  depends  upon  \^eing  able  to  de- 
ceive the  enemy;  and  having  once  gained 
this  point,  in  never  allowing  him  time  to 
recover  himself."  Villars  has  united  practice 
to  precept.  His  bold  and  rapid  marches 
were  almost  always  crowned  with  success. 

It  was  the  opinion  of  Frederick  that  all 
wars  should  be  short  and  rapid;  because  a 
long  Avar  insensibly  relaxes  discipline,  de- 
populates the  state,  and  exhausts  its  re- 
sources. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  37 


MAXIM    X. 

When  an  army  is  inferior  in  number, 
inferior  in  cavalry,  and  in  artillery,  it  is 
essential  to  avoid  a  general  action.  The 
first  deficiency  should  be  supplied  by  ra- 
pidity of  movement  ;  the  want  of  artil- 
lery, by  the  nature  of  the  manœuvres  ; 
and  the  inferiority  in  cavalry,  by  the 
choice  of  positions.  In  such  circumstan- 
ces, the  morale  of  the  soldier  does  much. 

NOTE. 

The  campaign  of  1814  in  France  was  skil- 
fully executed  upon  these  principles.  Na- 
poleon, with  an  array  inferior  in  number,  an 
army  discouraged  by  the  disastrous  retreats 
of  Moscow  and  of  Leipzig,  and  still  more  by 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  in  the  French 
territory,  contrived,  notwithstanding,  to  sup- 
ply his  vast  inequality  offeree  by  the  rapid- 
ity and  combination  of  his  movements.  By 
the  success  obtained  at  Champ-Aubert,  Mont- 
mirail,  Montereau,  and  Eheims,  he  began  to 
restore  the  morale  of  the  French  army.  The 
numerous  recruits  of  which  it  was  com- 
4 


S8  napoleon's  * 

posed,  liad  ak'eady  acquired  that  steadiness 
of  wbicli  the  old  ï*egiments  afforded  them 
an  example,  when  the  capture  of  Pai^is,  and 
the  astonishing  revolution  it  produced,  com- 
pelled Napoleon  to  lay  down  his  arms. 

But  this  cosenquence  resulted  rather  from 
the  force  of  circunistances  than  from  any  ab- 
solute necessity  ;  for  Napoleon,  by  carrying 
his  army  to  the  other  side  of  the  Loire, 
mijïht  easily  have  formed  a  junction  w^ith 
the  armies  of  the  Alps  and  Pyrenees,  and 
have  reappeared  on  the  field  of  battle  at  the 
head  of  a  hundred  thousand  men.  Such  a 
force  would  have  amply  sufficed  to  re-estab- 
lish the  chances  of  war  in  his  favor;  more 
especially  as  the  armies  of  the  allied  sove- 
reio-ns  were  obliged  to  manœuvre  upon  the 
French  territory  with  all  the  strong  places 
of  Italy  and  France  in  their  rear. 


MAXIM    XI. 

To  direct  operations  wîtli  lines  far  re- 
moved from  each  other,  and  without  com- 
munications, is  to  commit  a  fault  which 
always   gives   birth   to   a   second.      The 


MAXIMS   OP    WAR.  39 

detached  column  has  only  its  orders  for 
the  lirst  day.  Its  operations  on  the  fol- 
lowing day  depend  upon  what  may  have 
happened  to  the  main  body.  Thus,  this 
column  either  loses  time  upon  emergency, 
in  waiting  for  orders,  or  it  will  act  with- 
out them,  and  at  hazard.  Let  it  therefore 
be  held  as  a  principle,  that  an  army 
should  always  keep  its  columns  so  united 
as  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  passing  be- 
tween them  with  impunity.  Whenever, 
for  particular  reasons,  this  principle  is 
departed  from,  the  detached  corps  should 
be  independent  in  their  operations.  They 
should  move  toward  a  point  fixed  upon 
for  their  future  junction.  They  should 
advance  w^ithout  hesitating,  and  w^ithout 
waiting  for  fresh  orders  ;  and  every  pre- 
caution should  be  taken  to  prevent  an 
attack  upon  them  in  detail. 

NOTE. 

The  Austrian  army,  commanded  by  Field- 
marshal  Alvinzi,  was  divided  into  two  corps, 
destined  to  act  independently,  until  they 
should  accomplish  their  junction  before  Man- 


40  napoleon's 

tua.  The  first  of  these  corps,  consisting  of 
fortj^-five  thousand  men,  was  under  the  or- 
ders of  Alvinzi.  It  was  to  debouch  b}^  Monte 
Baido,  upon  the  positions  occupied  by  the 
French  army  on  the  Adige.  Tlie  second 
corps,  commanded  by  General  Provéra,  was 
destined  to  act  upon  the  lower  Adige,  and 
to  raise  the  blockade  of  Mantua.  Napo- 
leon, informed  of  the  enemy's  movements, 
but  not  entirely  comprehending  his  projects, 
confined  himself  to  concentrating  his  masses, 
and  giving  orders  to  the  troops  to  hold 
themselves  in  readiness  to  manœuvre.  In 
the  meantime,  fresh  information  satisfied  the 
general-in-chief  of  the  French  army  that  the 
corps  which  had  debouched  by  La  Coronna, 
over  Monte  Baldo,  was  endeavoring  to  form 
a  junction  with  its  cavalry  and  artillery — 
both  which,  having  crossed  the  Adige  at 
Dolce,  were  directing  their  march  upon  the 
plateau  of  Eivoli,  by  the  great  road  leading 
by  Incanole. 

Napoleon  immediately  foresaw  that,  by 
having  possession  of  the  plateau,  he  should 
be  able  to  prevent  this  junction,  and  obtain 
all  the  advantages  of  the  initiative.  He  ac- 
cordingly put  his  troops  in  motion,  and  at 
two  o'clock   in  the  morning  occupied  that 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  41 

important  position.  Once  master  of  the  point 
fixed  upon  for  the  junction  of  the  Austrian 
columns,  success  followed  all  his  dispositions. 
lie  repulsed  ever}^  attack,  made  seven  thou- 
sand prisoners,  and  took  several  standards 
and  twelve  pieces  of  cannoi.  At  two  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon,  the  battle  of  Kivoli  was 
already  gained,  when  Napoleon,  learning 
that  General  Provéra  had  jjassed  the  Adige 
'  at  Anghiari,  and  was  directing  his  march 
upon  Mantua,  left  to  his  generals  the  charge 
of  following  up  the  retreat  of  Alvinzi,  and 
placed  himself  at  the  head  of  a  division  for 
the  purpose  of  defeating  the  designs  of  Pro- 
véra. f 

By  a  rapid  march,  he  again  succeeded  in 
the  initiator}'  movement,  and  in  preventing 
the  garrison  of  Mantua  from  uniting  its  force 
with  the  relieving  army.  The  corps  intrust- 
ed with  the  blockade,  eager  to  distinguish 
itself  under  the  eyes  of  the  conqueror  of 
Eivoli,  compelled  the  garrison  to  retire  into 
the  place,  while  the  division  of  Victor,  for- 
getting the  fatigues  of  a  forced  march,  rushed 
with  impetuosity  on  the  relieving  army  in 
front.  At  this  mom.ent  a  sortie  from  the  lines 
of  St.  George  took  him  in  flank,  while  the 
corps  of  Augereau,  which  had  followed  the 


42  napoleon's 

march  of  the  Austrian  general,  attacked  him 
in  rear.  Provéra,  surrounded  on  all  sides, 
capitulated.  The  result  of  these  two  battles 
cost  the  Austrians  three  thousand  men  in 
killed  and  wounded,  twenty-two  thousand 
prisoners,  twenty <rfbur  standards,  and  forty- 
six  pieces  of  cannon. 


MAXIM   XII. 

An  army  ought  to  have  only  one  line 
of  operation.  This  should  be  preserved 
with  care,  and  never  abandoned  but  in 
the  last  extremity. 

NOTE. 

"The  line  of  communication  of  an  army," 
says  Montécuculli,  "  must  be  certain  and 
well  established,  for  every  army  that  acts 
from  a  distant  base,  and  is  not  careful  to 
keep  this  line  perfectly  open,  marches  upon 
a  precipice.  It  moves  to  certain  ruin,  as  may 
be  seen  by  an  infinity  of  examples.  In  fact, 
if  the  road  by  which  provisions,  ammunition 
and  reinforcements  are  to  be  brought  uj),  is 
not  entirely  secured — if  the  magazines,  the 


MAXIMS   OF   WAR.  43 

hospitals,  the  depots  of  arms,  and  the  places 
of  supply  are  not  fixed  and  commodiously 
situated — not  cfnly  the  army  cannot  keep  the 
field,  but  it  will  be  exposed  to  the  greatest 
dangers." 


MAXIM    XIII. 

The  distances  permitted  between  corps 
of  an  army  upon  the  march  must  he  gov- 
erned by  the  localities,  by  circumstances, 
and  by  the  object  in  view. 

NOTE. 

When  an  army  moves  at  a  distance  from 
the  enem}^,  the  columns  may  be  disposed 
along  the  road  so  as  to  favor  the  artillery 
and  baggage.  But  when  it  is  marching  into 
action,  the  different  corps  must  be  formed  in 
close  columns  in  order  of  battle.  Tlic  gen- 
erals must  take  care  that  the  heads  of  the 
columns,  which  are  to  attack  together,  do  not 
outstep  each  other-,  and  that  in  approaching 
the  field  of  action  they  preserve  the  relative 
intervals  required  for  deployment. 

"  The  marches  that  are  made  preparatory 


44  napoleon's 

to  a  battle  require,"  says  Frederick,  "  the 
greatest  precaution."  With  this  view,  he 
recommends  his  generals  to  be  particularly 
on  their  guard,  and  to  reconnoitre  the  ground 
at  successive  distances,  in  order  to  secure  the 
initiative  by  occupying  those  positions  most 
calculated  to  favor  an  attack.  On  a  retreat, 
it  is  the  opinion  of  many  generals  that  an 
army  should  concentrate  its  forces,  and 
march  in  close  columns  if  it  is  still  strong 
enough  to  resume  the  offensive;  for  b}^  this 
means  it  is  easy  to  form  the  line  when  a 
favorable  opportunity  presents  itself,  either 
for  holding  the  enemy  in  check  or  for  at- 
tacking him  if  he  is  not  in  a  situation  to 
accept  battle. 

Such  was  Moreau's  retreat  after  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Adda  by  the  Austro-Eussian 
army.  Th^  French  general,  after  having 
covered  the  evacuation  of  Milan,  took  up  a 
position  between  the  Po  and  the  Tanaro. 

His  camp  rested  upon  Alexandria  and 
Valentia,  two  capital  fortresses,  and  had  the 
advantage  of  covering  the  roads  to  Turin 
and  Savona,  by  which  he  could  effect  his 
retreat  in  case  he  was  unable  to  accomplish  a 
Junction  with  the  co?ys  d'année  of  Macdon- 
ald,  who  had  been  ordered  to  quit  the  king- 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  45 

(lorn  of  Naples,  and  hasten  his  marcli  into 
Tuscany. 

•  Forced  to  abandon  his  position  in  conse- 
quence of  the  insurrection  in  Piedmont  and 
Tuscany,  Moreau  retired  upon  Asti,  where 
he  learned  that  his  communication  with  the 
river  of  Genoa  had  just  been  cut  off  by  the 
capture  of  Ccva.  After  several  ineffectual 
attempts  to  retake  this  place,  he  saw  that 
his  only  safety  depended  upon  throwing  him- 
self into  the  mountains. 

To  effect  this  object,  he  directed  the  whole 
of  his  battering  train  and  heavy  baggage  by 
the  Col  de  Fenestrelle  upon  France  j  then 
opening  himself  a  way  over  the  St.  Bernard, 
he  gained  Loano  with  his  light  artillery  and 
the  small  proportion  of  field  equipment  he 
had  been  able  to  preserve. 

By  this  skilful  movement,  he  nat  only  re- 
tained his  communicatioit^S  with  France,  but 
was  enabled  to  observe  the  motions  of  the 
army  from  Naples,  and  to  facilitate  his  junc- 
tion with  it  by  directing  the  whole  of  his 
force  upon  the  points  necessary  for  that 
purpose. 

Macdonald,  in  the  meantime,  whose  only 
chance  of  success  depended  on  concentrating 
his   little  army,  neglected   this   precaution, 


46  napoAeon's 

and  was  beaten  in  three  successive  actions 
at  the  Trebia. 

B}^  this  retardment  of  his  march,  he  ren- 
dered all  Moreau's  measures  to  unite  the 
two  armies  in  the  plains  of  the  Po  useless, 
and  his  retreat,  after  his  brilliant  but  fruit- 
less efforts  at  the  Trebia,  defeated  the  other 
arrangements,  also,  which  the  former  had 
made  to  come  to  his  8upi:)ort  The  inactivity 
of  Marshal  Suwarrow,  however,  finally  en- 
abled the  French  general  to  accomplish  his 
junction  with  the  remains  of  the  army  from 
ISTaples.  Moreauthen  concentrated  his  whole 
force  upon  the  Appenines,  and  placed  him- 
self in  a  situation  to  defend  the  important 
positions  of  Liguria,  until  the  chances  of 
war  should  afford  him  an  opportunity  of  re- 
suming the  offensive. 

When,  after  a  decisive  battle,  an  army  has 
lost  its  artillery  aiîd  equipments,  and  is  con- 
sequently no  longer  in  a  state  to  assume  the 
offensive,  or  even  to  arrest  the  pursuit  of 
the  enemy,  it  would  seem  most  desirable  to 
divide  what  remains  into  several  corps,  and. 
order  them  to  march  by  separate  and  dis- 
tant routes  upon  the  base  of  operation,  and 
throw  themselves  into  the  fortresses.  This 
is  the  only  means  of  safety  :  for  the  enemy, 


MAXIMS   OF    WAR.  47 

uncertain  as  to  the  precise  direction  taken 
by  the  vanquished  army,  is  ignorant  in  the 
first  instance  which  corps  to  pursue,  and  it 
is  in  this  moment  of  indecision  that  a  march 
is  gained  upon  him.  Besides,  tlie  move- 
ments of  a  small  body  being  so  much  easier 
than  those  of  a  larger  one,  these  separate 
lines  of  march  are  all  in  favor  of  a  retreat- 
ing army. 


:m  A  X I M   X I  y . 

Among  mountains,  a  great  number  of 
positions  are  always  to  be  found  very 
strong  in  themselves,  and  which  it  is  dan- 
gerous to  attack.  The  character  of  this 
mode  of  warfare  consists  in  occupying 
camps  on  tlie  flanks  or  in  the  rear  of  the 
enemy,  leaving  him  only  the  alternative 
of  abandoning  his  position  without  light- 
ing, to  take  up  another  in  the  rear,  or  to 
descend  from  it  in  order  to  attack  you. 
In  mountain  warfare,  the  assailant  has 
always  the  disadvantage  ;  even  in  oflen- 
Bive  warfare  in  the  open  field,  the  great 


48  napoleon's 

secret  consists  in  defensive  combats,  and 
in  obliging  the  enemy  to  attack. 

NOTE  . 

During  the  campaign  of  1793,  in  the  Mar- 
itime Alps,  the  French  army,  under  the  or- 
ders of  General  Brunet,  did  all  in  its  power 
to  get  possession  of  the  camps  at  Raus  and 
at  Fourches,  by  an  attack  in  front.  But 
these  useless  efforts  served  only  to  increase 
the  courage  of  the  Piedmontese,  and  to  de- 
stroy the  élite  of  the  grenadiers  of  the  repub- 
lican army.  The  manœuvres  by  which  Napo- 
leon, without  fighting,  compelled  the  enemy 
to  evacuate  these  positions  in  1796,  suffice  to 
establish  the  truth  of  these  principles,  and 
to  prove  how  much  success  in  war  depends 
upon  the  genius  of  the  general  as  well  as  on 
the  courage  of  the  soldier. 


MAXIM    XV. 

The  first  consideration  with  a  general 
who  offers  battle,  should  be  the  glory  and 
honor  of  his  arms  ;  the  safety  and  preser- 
vation of  his  men  is  only  the  second  ;  but 


MAXIMS    OF    WAP.  49 

it  is  ill  the  enterprise  and  courage  result- 
ing from  the  former,  that  tlie  latter  will 
most  assuredly  be  found.  In  a  retreat, 
besides  the  honor  of  the  army,  the  loss  of 
life  is  often  greater  than  in  two  battles. 
For  this  reason,  we  should  never  despair 
while  brave  men  are  to  be  found  with 
their  colors.  It  is  by  this  means  that  we 
obtain  victory,  and  deserve  to  obtain  it. 

NOTE. 

In  1G45,  the  French  army,  under  the  or- 
ders of  the  Prince  of  Condé,  was  on  the 
march  to  lay  siege  to  Nordlingen,  when  it 
was  discovered  that  Count  Merci,  who  com- 
manded the  Bavarians,  had  foreseen  this 
intention,  and  had  entrenched  himself  in  a 
strong  position  which  defended  Nordlingen 
at  the  same  time  that  it  covered  Donawerth. 

Notwithstanding  the  favorable  position  of 
the  enemy,  Condé  ordered  the  attack.  The 
combat  was  terrible.  All  the  infantry  in 
the  centre  and  on  the  right,  after  being 
successively  engaged,  wa«  routed  and  dis- 
persed, in  spite  of  the  eflPorts  of  the  cavalry 
and  the  reserve,  which  were  likewise  carried 
away  with  the  fugitives.  The  battle  was 
5 


50  napoleon's 

lost.  Condé,  in  despair,  having  no  longer 
either  centre  or  right  to  depend  upon,  col- 
lected the  remnants  of  his  battalions,  and 
directed  his  march  to  the  left,  where  Turenne 
was  still  engaged.  This  perseverance  re- 
animated the  ardor  of  the  troops.  They 
broke  the  right  wing  of  the  enemy,  and 
Turenne,  by  a  change  of  front,  returned  to 
the  attack  upon  his  centre.  Night,  too, 
favored  the  boldness  of  Condé.  An  entire 
corps  of  Bavarians,  fancying  themselves  cut 
off,  laid  down  their  arms;  and  the  obstinacy 
of  the  French  general  in  this  struggle  for 
victory  was  repaid  by  possession  of  the  field 
of  battle,  together  with  a  great  number  of 
prisoners,  and  almost  all  tlie  enemy's  artil- 
lery. The  Bavarian  army  beat  a  retreat, 
and  the  next  day  Nordlingen  capitulated. 


MAXIM    XYI. 

It  is  an  approved  maxim  in  war,  never 
to  do  what  the  ^nemy  wishes  you  to  do, 
for  this  reason  alone,  that  he  desires  it. 
A  field  of  battle,  therefore,  which  he 
has  previously  studied  and  reconnoitred, 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  51 

should  be  avoided,  and  double  care  should 
be  taken  wliere  he  has  had  time  to  fortify 
and  entrench.  One  consequence  deduci- 
ble  from  thi.s  principle  is,  never  to  attack 
a  position  in  front  which  you  can  gain  by 
turning. 

NOTE. 

It  Aviis  without  duc  regard  to  this  prin- 
ciple, that  Marshal  Yilleroi,  on  assuming  the 
command  of  the  army  of  Italy,  during  the 
campaign  of  1701,  attacked,  with  unwar- 
rantable presumption,  Prince  Eugene,  of 
Savoy,  in  liis  entrenched  position  of  Chiavi, 
on  the  Oglio.  The  French  generals,  Catinat 
among  the  rest,  considered  the  post  unas- 
sailable, but  Yilleroi  insisted,  and  the  result 
of  this  otherwise  unimportant  battle  was 
the  loss  of  the  élite  of  tlie  French  army.  It 
would  have  been  greater  still,  but  for  Cati- 
nat's  exertions. 

It  was  by  neglecting  the  same  principle, 
that  the  Prince  of  Condé,  in  the  campaign 
of  1614,  failed  in  all  his  attacks  upon  the 
entrenched  position  of  the  Bavarian  army. 
The  Count  Merci,  who  commanded  the  latter,' 
had  drawn  up  his  cavalry  skilfully  upon  the 


52  napoleon's 

plain,  resting  upon  Freyberg,  while  his  in- 
fkntiy  occupied  the  mountain.  After  many 
fruitless  attempts,  the  Prince  of  Condé, 
seeing  the  impossibility  of  dislodging  the 
enemy,  began  to  menace  his  communica- 
tions— but  the  moment  Merci  perceived  this, 
he  broke  up  his  camp  and  retired  beyond 
the  Black  mountains. 


MAXIM    XVII. 

Ill  a  war  of  marcli  and  manœuvre,  if 
you  would  avoid  a  battle  wâtli  a  superior 
army,  it  is  necessary  to  entrench  every 
night,  and  occupy  a  good  defensive  posi- 
tion. Those  natural  positions  wliich  are 
ordinarily  met  with,  are  not  sufficient  to 
protect  an  army  against  superior  numbers 
without  recourse  to  art. 

NOTE. 

The  campaign  of  the  French  and  Spanish 
army,  commanded  by  the  Duke  of  Berwick, 
against  the  Portuguese,  in  the  j^ear  1706, 
affords  a  good  lesson  on  this  subject.  The 
two  armies  made  almost  the  tour  of  Spain 


MAXIMS   OF   WAR.  53 

They  began  the  campaign  near  Badajoz,  and 
after  manœuvring  across  both  Castilcs,  fin- 
ished it  in  the  kingdoms  of  Valencia  and 
Mnrcia,  Tlie  Duke  of  Berwick  encamped 
his  army  eighty-five  times,  and  although  the 
campaign  passed  without  a  general  action, 
he  took  about  ten  thousand  prisoners  from 
the  enemy.  Marshal  Turenne  also  made  a 
fine  campaign  of  manœuvre  against  the 
Count  Montécuculli,  in  1G75. 

The  imperial  army  having  made  its  ar- 
rangements to  pass  the  Rhine  at  Strasburg, 
Turenne  used  all  diligence,  and,  throwing  a 
bridge  over  the  river  near  the  village  of 
Ottenheim,  three  leagues  below  Strasburg, 
he  crossed  with-  the  French  army,  and  en- 
camped close  to  the  little  town  of  Yilstet, 
which  he  occupied.  This  position  covered 
the  bridge  of  Strasburg,  so  that,  by  this 
manoeuvre,  Turenne  deprived  the  enemy  of 
all  ai)proach  to  that  city. 

Upon  this,  Montécuculli  made  a  movement 
with  his  whole  army,  threatening  the  bridge 
at  Ottenheim,  b}'  which  the  French  received 
their  provisions  from  upper  Alsace. 

As  soon  as  Turenne  discovered  the  desijxn 
of  the  enemy,  he  left  a  detachment  at  Yil- 
stet, and  made  a  rapid  march  with  his  whole 


54  NAPOLKOX'S 

force  iipoii  the  village  of  Altenheim.  This 
intermediate  position  between  the  two 
bridLçes,  which  he  wished  to  preserve,  gave 
him  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  succor 
either  of  these  posts  before  the  enemy  had 
time  to  carry  them.  MontécucuUi  seeing 
that  any  successful  attack  upon  the  bridges 
was  not  to  bo  expceto(i,  resolved  to  pass 
the  Ehine  below  Strasbiirg,  and  witli  this 
view  returned  to  his  first  position  at  Offen- 
burg.  Marshal  Turenne,  who  followed  all 
the  movements  of  the  Austrian  ai-niy,  brought 
baclv  his  army  also  to  Vilstet. 

In  the  meantime,  this  attempt  of  the 
enemy  having  convinced  the  French  general 
of  tlie  danger  to  which  his  bridge  had  ex- 
posed him,  removed  it  lu'ai'cr  to  that  of 
Strasburg,  in  order  to  diminish  the  extent 
of  grouiT'l  he  had  to  defend. 

MontécucuUi,  having  commanded  the  ma- 
gistrates of  Strasburg  to  collect  materials 
for  a  bridge,  moved  to  Scherzheim  to  receive 
them  ;  but  Turenne  again  defeated  his  ])ro- 
jects  by  taking  a  i>osition  at  Freistett,  where 
he  occupied  the  islands  of  the  l^hine,  and 
immediately  constructed  a  stockade. 

Thus  it  was  that,  during  the  whole  of 
this  campaign,  Turenne  succeeded   in   gain- 


MAXIMS   OF   WAR.  55 

ing  the  initiative  of  the  enemy,  and  obliging 
liim  to  follow  his  movements.  He  succeeded, 
also,  by  a  rapid  march,  in  cutting  off  Monté- 
ciicuUi  from  the  Town  of  Offenburg,  whence 
he  drew  his  supplies,  and  would  no  doubt 
have  prevented  the  Austrian  general  from 
effecting  his  junction  with  the  corps  of  Cap- 
rara,  had  not  a  cannon-shot  terminated  this 
great  man's  life. 


MAXIM     XYIII. 

A  general  of  ordinary  talent  occupying 
a  bad  position,  and  surprised  by  a  supe- 
rior force,  seeks  his  safety  in  retreat  ;  but 
a  great  captain  supplies  all  deficiencies 
by  his  courage,  and  marches  boldly  to 
meet  the  attack.  By  this  means  lie  dis- 
concerts his  adversar}^  ;  and  if  the  latter 
shows  any  irresolution  in  his  movements, 
a  skilful  leader,  profiting  by  his  indecision, 
may  even  hope  for  victory,  or  at  least 
employ  the  day  in  manœuvring — at  night 
he  entrenches  himself,  or  falls  back  to  a 
better  position.     By  this  determined  con- 


66  napoleon's 

duct  lie  maintains  the  honor  of  his  arms, 
the  iirst  essential  to  all  luilitarv  superi- 
ority. 

NOTE. 

In  IGo^i,  Marshal  Tiircnnc  was  surprised 
by  the  Prince  of  Condé,  in  a  position  wliere 
his  army  was  completely  com})romised.  lie 
had  the  power,  indeed,  by  an  immediate 
retreat,  of  covering  himself  l)y  the  Somme, 
which  he  possessed  the  means  of  crossing  at 
Peronne,  and  whence  he  was  distant  only 
half  a  league;  but,  fearing  the  influence  of 
this  retrograde  movement  on  the  morale  of 
bis  army,  Turenne  balanced  all  disadvan- 
tages by  his  courage,  and  marched  boldly  to 
meet  the  enemy  with  very  inferior  forces. 
After  marching  a  league,  he  found  an  advan- 
tageous position,  where  he  made  every  ilis- 
position  for  a  battle.  It  was  three  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon;  but  the  Spaniards,  ex- 
hausted with  fatigue,  hesitated  to  attack 
hiin,  and  Turenne  liaving  covered  himself 
witii  entrenchments  during  the  night,  the 
enemy  no  longer  dared  to  risk  a  general 
action,  and  broke  up  his  camp. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAK.  57 

MAXIM    XIX. 

The  transition  from  the  defensive  to 
the  offensive  is  one  of  the  most  delicate 
operations.  , 

NOTE. 

By  studying  the  first  campa ign  of  Napo- 
leon in  Italy,  we  can  learn  what  genius  and 
boldness  may  effect  in  passing  with  an  army 
from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive.  The  army 
of  the  îdlies,  commanded  by  General  Eeau- 
lieu,  was  provided  with  every  means  that 
could  render  it  formidable.  Its  force  amount- 
ed to  eighty  thousand  men,  and  two  hun- 
dred pieces  of  cannon.  The  French  army, 
on  the  contrar}",  could  number  scared}^  thirty 
thousand  men  under  arms,  and  thirty  pieces 
of  cannon.  For  some  time  there  had  been 
no  issue  of  meat,  and  even  the  bread  was 
irregularl}^  supplied.  The  infantry  was  ill 
clothed,  the  cavalry  wretchedly  mounted. 
All  the  draught-horses  had  perished  from 
want,  so  that  the  service  of  the  artiUery  was 
performed  bj'^  mules.  To  remedy  these  evils, 
large  disbursements  were  necessary  -,  and 
such  was  the  state  of  the  finances,  that  tlic 


58  napoleon's 

government  had  only  been  able  to  furnish 
two  thousand  louis  in  specie  for  the  opening 
of  the  campaign.  The  French  army  could 
not  possibly  exist  in  this  state.  To  advance 
or  retreat  was  absolutely  necessary.  Aware 
of  the  advantage  of  surprising  the  enemy  at 
the  very  outset  of  the  campaign  b}^  some 
decisive  blow,  Napoleon  prepared  for  it  by 
recasting  the  morale  of  his  army. 

In  a  proclamation  full  of  energy,  he  re- 
minded them  tliat  an  ignoble  death  alone 
remained  for  them,  if  they  continued  on  the 
defensive;  that  they  had  nothing  to  expect 
from  France,  but  everything  to  hope  from 
victory,  "xlbundance  courts  you  in  the  fer- 
tile plains  of  Italy,"  said  he  ;  "  are  you  defi- 
cient, soldiers,  in  constancy  or  in  courage?" 
Profiting  by  the  moment  of  enthusiasm 
which  he  had  inspired,  Napoleon  concen- 
trated his  forces  in  order  to  fall  with  his 
whole  weight  on  the  different  corps  of  the 
enemy.  Immediatel}^  afterward,  the  battles 
of  Montenotte,  Milesimo,  and  Mondovi,  ad- 
ded fresh  confidence  to  the  high  opinion 
already  entertained  by  the  soldier  for  his 
chief;  and  that  army  Avhich  only  a  few  days 
ago  was  encamped  amid  barren  rocks,  and 
consumed  by  famine,  already  aspired  to  the 


MAXIMS    OF    WARr.  59 

conquest  of  Italy.  In  one  month  after  the 
opening  of  the  campaign,  Napoleon  had  ter- 
minated the  war  with  the  King  of  Sardinia, 
and  conquered  the  Milanese.  Eich  canton- 
ments soon  dispelled  from  the  recollection  of 
the  French  soldier  the  misery  and  fatigue 
attendant  on  this  rapid  march,  while  a  vigi- 
lant administration  of  the  resources  of  the 
country  reorganized  the  rnateriel  of  the 
French  army,  and  created  the  means  neces- 
sary for  the  attainment  of  future  success. 


MAXIM    XX. 

It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  principle, 
tliat  the  line  of  operation  should  not  be 
abandoned  ;  but  it  is  one  of  the  most 
skilful  manœuvres  in  war,  to  know  how 
to  change  it,  when  circumstances  author- 
ize or  render  this  necessary.  An  army 
w^hich  changes  skilfully  its  line  of  oper- 
ation deceives  the  enemy,  who  becomes 
ignorant  where  to  look  for  its  rear,  or 
upon  what   weak  points  it  is  assailable. 


60  napoleon's 

NOTE. 

Frederick  sometimes  changed  liis  lino  of 
operation  in  the  middle  of  a  campaign  ;  but 
he  was  enabled  to  do  this,  because  he  was 
manoeuvring  at  that  time  in  the  centre  of 
German}^ — an  abundant  countr}^,  capable  of 
supplying  all  the  wants  of  his  army  in  case 
his  communications  with  Prussia  were  inter- 
cepted. 

Marshal  Turenne,  in  the  campaign  of 
1746,  gave  up  his  line  of  communication  to 
the  allies  in  the  same  manner  ;  but,  like 
Frederick,  he  was  carrying  on  the  war  at 
this  time  in  the  centre  of  Germany,  and 
having  fallen  with  his  whole  forces  upon 
Rain,  he  took  the  precaution  of  securing 
to  himself  a  depot  upon  which  to  establish 
his  base  of  operation. 

By  a  series  of  manœuvres,  marked  alike 
by  audacity  and  genius,  he  subsequently 
compelled  the  imperial  army,  to  abandon 
its  magazines,  and    retire  into    Austria  for 

CD  •^ 

winter  quarters. 

Eut  these  are  examples  which  it  appears  to 
me  should  only  be  imitated  when  we  have 
taken  full  measure  of  the  capacity  of  our 
adversary,  and  above   all,  when  we  see  no 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  61 

reason  to  apprehend  an  insurrection  in  the 
country  to  which  we  transfer  the  theatre 
of  war. 


MAXIM   XXI. 

When  an  army  carries  \vith  it  a  batter- 
ing train,  or  large  convoys  of  sick  and 
wounded,  it  cannot  march  by  too  short 
a  line  upon  its  depots. 

NOTE. 

It  is  above  all  in  mountainous  countries, 
and  in  those  interspersed  with  woods  and 
marshes,  that  it  is  of  importance  to  observe 
this  maxim  ;  for,  the  convoys  and  means  of 
transport  being  frequently  embarrassed  in 
defiles,  an  enemy  by  manœuvring  may  easily 
disperse  the  escorts,  or  make  even  a  success- 
ful attack  upon  the  whole  army,  when  it  is 
obliged,  from  the  nature  of  the  country,  to 
march  in  an  extended  column. 


MAXIM   XXII. 

The  art  of  encamping  in  position  is  the 
same  as  taking  up  the  line  in  order  of 
6 


62  napoleon's 

battle  in  this  position.  To  this  end,  the 
artillery  should  be  adv^antageousW  placed, 
ground  should  be  selected  which  is  not 
commanded  or  liable  to  be  turned,  and, 
as  far  as  possible,  the  guns  should  cover 
and  command  the  surrounding  country. 

NOTE. 

Frederick  has  remarked  that,  in  order  to 
be  assured  that  3'our  camp  is  well  placed, 
you  should  see  if,  by  making  a  small  move- 
ment, 3^ou  can  oblige  the  enemy  to  make  a 
greater;  or,  if  after  having  forced  him  to 
retrogade  one  march  you  can  compel  him  to 
fall  back  another. 

In  defensive  war,  all  camps  should  be  en- 
trenched in  the  front  and  wings  of  the  posi- 
tion they  occupy,  and  care  should  be  taken 
that  the  rear  is  left  perfectly  open.  If  you 
are  threatened  with  being  turned,  arrange- 
ments should  be  made  beforehand  for  taking 
up  a  more  distant  position  ;  and  you  should 
profit  by  any  disorder  in  the  enemy's  line  of 
march,  to  make  an  attempt  upon  his  artil- 
lery or  baggage. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  63 

MAXIM     XXIII. 

When  you  are  occupying  a  position 
which  the  enemy  threatens  to  surround, 
collect  all  your  force  immediately,  and 
menace  him  with  an  offensive  movement. 
By  this  manœuvre,  you  will  prevent  him 
from  detaching  and  annoying  your  flanks 
in  case  you  should  judge  it  necessary  to 
retire. 

NOTE. 

This  was  the  manœuvi'^  practised  by  Gene- 
ral Desaix,  in  1798,  near  Radstadt.  lie  made 
up  for  inferiority  in  numbers  by  audacity, 
and  maintained  himself  the  whole  day  in 
position  in  spite  of  the  vigorous  attacks  of 
the  Archduke  Charles.  At  night  he  effected 
his  retreat  in  good  order,  and  took  up  a  posi- 
tion in  the  rear.         *  ^ 

It  was  in  accordance,  also,  with  this  prin- 
ciple, in  the  same  campaign,  tliat  General 
Moreau  gave  battle  at  Bibcrach,  to  secure 
his  retreat  by  the  passes  of  the  Black  moun- 
tains. A  few  days  after,  he  fought  at  Schli- 
engen  with  the  same  object.  Placed  in  a 
good    defensive   position,    he    menaced    the 


G4  napoleon's 

Archduke  Charles  by  a  sudden  return  to  the 
offensive,  while  his  artiller}^  and  baggage 
were  passing  the  Khine  by  the  bridge  of 
Hiiningen,  and  he  was  making  all  the  neces- 
sary arrangements  for  retiring  behind  that 
river  himself. 

Here,  however,  I  would  observe,  that  the 
execution  of  such  offensive  demonstrations 
should  be  deferred  alwaj^s  till  toward  the 
evening,  in  order  that  you  may  not  be  com- 
promised by  engaging  too  earl}^  in  a  combat 
which  you  cannot  long  maintain  with  suc- 
cess. 

JSTight,  and  the  uncertainty  of  the  enemy 
after  an  affair  of  this  kind,  will  always  favor 
your  retreat,  if  it  is  judged  necessary;  but, 
with  a  view  to  mask  the  operation  more 
effectually,  fires  should  be  lighted  all  along 
the  lines,  to  deceive  the  enemy  and  prevent 
him  from  discovering  this  retrograde  move- 
ment, for  in  a  retreat  it  is  a  great  advantage 
to  gain  a  march  upon  your  adversary. 


MAXIM     XXI A^ 

iSTever  lose  siglit  of  tliis  maxim:  that 
you  sliould  establish  your  cantonments  at 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  65 

the  most  distant  and  best-protected  point 
from  the  enemy,  especially  where  a  sur- 
prise is  possible.  By  this  means  you  will 
have  time  to  unite  all  your  forces  before 
he  can  attack  you. 

NOTE. 

Ill  the  campaign  of  1745,  Marshal  Tu- 
renne  lost  the  battle  of  Marienthal,  by  neg- 
lecting this  principle;  for  if,  instead  of 
reassembling  his  divisions  at  Erbsthausen, 
he  had  rallied  his  troops  at  Mergentheim, 
behind  the  Taubcr,  his  army  would  have 
been  much  sooner  reunited;  and  Count  Mer- 
ci, in  place  of  finding  only  three  thousand 
men  to  fight  at  Erbsthausen  (of  which  he 
was  well  informed),  Avould  have  had  the 
whole  French  arm}^  to  attack  in  a  position 
covered  b}^  a  river. 

Some  one  having  indiscreetly  asked  Vis- 
count Turenne  how  he  had  lost  the  battle  of 
Marienthal  :  "  By  my  own  fault,"  replied  the 
marshal;  "but,"  added  he,  "when  a  man  has 
committed  no  faults  in  war,  he  can  only 
have  been  engaged  in  it  but  a  short  time." 


66  napoleon's 


MAXIM    XXY. 

When  two  armies  are  in  order  of  bat- 
tle,jand  one  has  to  retire  over  a  bridge, 
while  the  other  has  the  circumference  of 
the  circle  open,  all  the  advantages  are  in 
favor  of  the  latter.  It  is  then  a  general 
should  show  boldness,  strike  a  decided 
'blow,  and  manœuvre  upon  the  flank  of 
his  enemy.     The  victory  is  in  his  hands. 

NOTE. 

This  was  the  position  of  the  French  army 
at  the  famous  battle  of  Leipzig,  which  ter- 
minated the  campaign  of  1813  so  fatally  for 
Napoleon;  for  the  battle  of  Ilanau  was  of 
no  consequence,  comparatively,  in  the  des- 
perate situation  of  that  army. 

It  strikes  me  that,  in  a  situation  like  that 
of  the  French  army  previous  to  the  battle 
of  Leipzig,  a  general  should  never  calculate 
upon  any  of  those  lucky  chances  which  may 
arise  out  of  a  return  to  the  offensive,  but 
that  he  should  rather  adopt  every  possible 
means  to  secure  his  retreat.  With  this  view, 
he  should  immediately*  cover  himself  with 
good  entrenchments,  to  enable  him  to  repel 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  67 

with  inferior  numbers  the  attack  of  the  ene- 
my, while  his  own  equipments  are  crossing 
the  river.  As  fast  as  the  troops  reach  the 
other  side,  they  should  occupy  positions  to 
protect  the  passage  of  the  rear  guard,  and 
this  last  should  be  covered  by  a  tête  de  j)ont 
as  soon  as  the  army  breaks  up  its  camp. 
During  the  wars  of  the  Revolution,  too  little 
regard  was  paid  to  entrenchments;  and  it  is 
for  this  reason  we  have  seen  large  armies 
dispersed  after  a  single  reverse,  and  the  fate 
of  nations  compromised  b}^  the  issue  of  one 
battle. 


MAXIM    XXVI.  ' 

It  is  contrarj^  to  all  true  principle,  to 
make  corps,  which  have  no  communica- 
tion with  each  other,  act  separately  against 
a  central  force  whose  communications  are 
cut  off. 

NOTE. 

The  Austrians  lost  the  battle  of  Hohen- 
linden  by  neglecting  this  principle.  The 
imperial  army,  under  the  orders  of  the  arch- 
duke John,  was  divided  into  four  columns, 


68  napoleon's 

which  had  to  march  through  an  immense 
forest,  previous  to  their  junction  in  the  plain 
of  Anzing,  where  they  intended  to  surprise 
the  French.  But  these  different  corps,  hav- 
ing no  direct  communication,  found  them- 
selves compelled  to  engage  separately  with 
an  enemy  who  had  taken  the  precaution  of 
concentrating  his  masses,  and  who  could 
move  them  with  facility  in  a  country  with 
which  he  had  been  long  previously  acquaint- 
ed. 

Thus  the  Austrian  army,  enclosed  in  the 
'  defiles  of  the  forest  with  its  whole  train  of 
artillery  and  baggage,  was  attacked  in  its 
flanks  and  rear,  and  the  archduke  John  was 
only  enabled  to  rally  his  dispersed  and  shat- 
tered divisions  under  cover  of  the  night. 

The  trophies  obtained  by  the  French  army 
on  this  day  were  immense.  They  consisted 
of  eleven  thousand  prisoners,  one  hundred 
pieces  of  cannon,  several  stand  of  colors,  and 
all  the  baggage  of  the  enemy. 

The  battle  of  Hohenlinden  decided  the  fate 
pf  the  campaign  of  1800,  and  Moreau's  bril- 
liant and  well-merited  success  placed  him  in 
the  rank  of  the  first  general  of  the  age. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  69 

MAXIM    XXVII. 

When  ail  army  is  driven  from  a  first 
position,  the  retreating  cohimns  should 
rally  always  sufficiently  in  the  rear,  to 
prevent  any  interruption  from  the  enemy. 
The  greatest  disaster  that  can  happen,  is 
when  the  columns  are  attacked  in  detail, 
and  before  their  junction. 

NOTE. 

One  great  advantage  whicli  results  from 
rallying  your  cohimns  on  a  point  far  removed 
from  the  field  of  battle,  or  from  the  position 
previously  occupied,  is,  that  the  enemy  is 
uncertain  as  to  the  direction  you  mean  to 
take! 

If  he  divides  his  force  to  pursue  you,  he 
exposes  himself  to  see  his  detachments  beaten 
in  detail,  especially  if  j^ou  have  exerted  all 
due  diligence,  and  have  effected  the  junction 
of  your  troops  in  sufficient  time  to  get  be- 
tween his  columns  and  disperse  them  one 
after  the  other. 

It  was  by  a  manœuvre  of  this  kind  in  the 
campaign  of  Italy,  in  1799,^hat  General 
Melas  gained  the  battle  of  Genola. 


70  napoleon's 

General  Championet  commanded  the 
l^rench  army,  and  endeavored  to  cul^  off  the 
communication  of  the  Austrians  with  Timn, 
by  employing  corps  which  manœuvred  sep- 
arately to  get  into  their  rear.  Melas,  who 
divined  his  project,  made  a  retrograde  march, 
by  which  he  persuaded  his  adversary  he  was 
in  full  retreat,  although  the  real  object  of  his 
movement  was  to  concentrate  his  forces  at 
the  point  fixed  for  the  junction  of  the  differ- 
ent detachments  of  the  French  army,  and 
which  he  beat  and  dispersed,  one  after 
another,  by  his  great  superiority  in  numbers. 
The  result  of  this  manoeuvre,  in  which  the 
x^ustrian  general  displayed  vigor,  decision, 
and  foresight,  secured  to  him  the  peaceable 
possession  of  Piedmont. 

It  was  also  by  the.  neglect  of  this  principje 
that  General  Beaulieu,  who  commanded  the 
Austro-Sardinian  army  in  the  campaign  of 
179G,  lost  the  battle  of  Milesimo  after  that 
of  Montenotte. 

His  object,  in  endeavoring  to  rally  his 
different  corps  upon  Milesimo,  was,  to  cover 
the  high  roads  of  Turin  and  Milan  ;  but 
I^Tapoleon,  aw^^-e  of  the  advantages  arising 
from  the  ardor  of  troops  emboldened  by 
recent  success,  attacked  him  before  he  could 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  71 

assemble  his  divisions,  and,  by  a  scries  of 
skilful  manœuvres,  succeeded  in  separating 
the  combined  armies.  They  retired  in  the 
greatest  disorder — the  one  by  the  road  of 
Milan,  the  other  by  tluit  of  Turin. 


MAXIM    XXYIII. 

1^0  force  should  be  detached  on  the  eve 
of  a  battle,  because  aiFairs  may  change 
during  the  night,  either  by  the  retreat  of 
the  enemy,  or  by  the  arrival  of  large  rein- 
forcements to  enable  him  to  resume  the 
offensive,  and  counteract  your  previous 
arrangements. 


NOTE. 


In  179G,  the  army  of  the  Sambre  and 
Meuse,  commanded  by  General  Jourdan, 
effected  a  retreat,  which  was  rendered  still 
more  difficult  by  the  loss  of  his  line  of  com- 
munication. Seeing,  however,  that  the  forces 
of  the  archduke  Charles  were  scattered, 
Jourdan,  in  order  to  accomplish  his  retreat 
upon  Frankfort,  resolved  to  open  himself  a 
way  by  AYurtzberg,  where  there  were  at  that 


72  napoleon's 

moment  only  two  divisions  of  the  Austrian 
army.  This  movement  would  have  been  at- 
tended with  success,  if  the  French  general, 
believing  he  had  simply  these  two  divisions 
to  contend  with,  had  not  committed  the  error 
of  separating  himself  from  the  corps  of  Le- 
fevre — which  he  left  at  Schweinfurt  to  cover 
the  only  direct  communication  of  the  army 
with  its  base  of  operation. 

The  commission  of  this  fault  at  the  outset, 
added  to  some  slowness  in  the  march  of  the 
French  general,  secured  the  victory  to  the 
archduke,  who  hastened  to  concentrate  his 
forces. 

The  arrival  of  the  two  divisions,  also,  of 
Kray  and  Wartesleben,  during  the  battle, 
enabled  him  to  oppose  fifty  thousand  men  to 
the  French  army,  which  scarcely  numbered 
thirty  thousand  combatants.  This  last  was 
consequently  beaten,  and  obliged  to  continue 
its  retreat  by  the  mountains  of  Fuldes,  where 
the  badness  of  the  roads  could  be  equalled 
orUy  by  the  difficulty  of  the  country. 

The  division  of  Lefevre,  amounting  to  four- 
teen thousand  :^n,  ^yould,  in  all  probability, 
have  turned  the  scale  in  favor  of  Jourdan, 
had  the  latter  not  unfortunately  conceived 
that  two  divisions  only  were  opj^osing  his 
passage  to  Wurtzburg. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  73 


MAXIM    XXIX. 

When  you  have  resolved  ta  fight  a 
battle,  collect  your  whole  force.  Dis- 
pense with  nothing.  A  single  battalion 
sometimes  decides  the  day, 

NOTE. 

I  think  it  here  desirable  to  observe',  that  it 
is  prudent  before  a  battle  to  fix  mpon  some 
point  in  reaV  of  the  reserve  for  the  junction 
of  the  different  detachments;  for  if,  from 
unforeseen  circumstances,  these  detachments 
should  be  prevented  from  joiViing  bef  )re  the 
action  has  commenced,  they  might  be  ex- 
posed, in  case  a  retrograd'e  movement  should 
be  found  necessary,  to-  the  masses  of  the 
enemy.  It  is  desirabl-e  also  to  keep  the 
enemy  in  ignorance  of  these  reyiforcements, 
in  order  to  employ  them  with  greater  effect. 
"A  seasonable  reinforcement,"  , says  Fred- 
erick, "renders  the  success  of  a  battle  cer- 
tain, because  the  enemy  will  always  imagine 
it  stronger  than  it  really  is,  and  lose  courage 
accordingly  " 


74  napoleon's 

MAXIM    XXX. 

Notliiiig  is  so  rasli  or  so  contrary  to 
principle,  as  to  make  a  flank  march  be- 
fore an  army  in  position,  especially  when 
this  army  occupies  heights  at  the  foot 
of  which  you  are  forced  to  defile. 

N  0  T  E  r 

It  was  hy  a  neglect  of  this  principle  that 
Frederick  was  beaten  ^t  Kollin  in  the  first 
campaign  of  1757.  Notwith-standiiig  pro- 
digies of  valor,  the  Prussians  lost  fifteen 
thousand  men  and  a  great  portion  of  their 
artillery,  while  the  loss  of  the  Austrians  did 
not  exceed  five  thousand  men.  The  conse- 
quence of  this  battle  was  more  unfortunate 
still,  since  it  obliged  the  King  of  Prussia  to 
raise  the  siege  of  Prague,  and  to  evacuate 
Bohemia. 

It  Avas  also  by  making  a  flank  march 
before  the  Prussian  army,  that  the  French 
lost  the  disgraceful  battle  of  Ilosbach. 

This  imprudent  movement  was  still  more 
to  be  reprehended,  because  the  Prince  de 
Soubise,  who  commanded  the  French  army, 
was  so  negligent  as  to  manœuvre,  without 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  75 

either  advanced  guards  or  flanking  corps,  in 
l)resence  of  tlie  enemy.  The  result  was, 
that  his  army,  consisting  of  fifty  thousand 
men,  was  beaten  by  six  battalions  and  thirty 
squadrons.  The  French  lost  seven  thousand 
men,  twenty-seven  standards,  and  a  great 
number  of  cannon.  The  Prussians  had  only 
three  hundred  men  disabled. 

Thus,  by  having  forgotten  this  principle, 
that  a  flank  march  is  never  to  be  made  before 
an  enemy  in  line  of  battle,  Frederick  lost  his 
army  at  Kollin;  and  Soubise,  at  Eosbach, 
lost  both  his  army  and  his  honor. 


MAXIM  XXXT. 

When  you  determine  to  risk  a  battle, 
reserve  to  yourself  every  possible  chance 
of  success,  more  particularly  if  you  have 
to  deal  with  an  adversary  of  superior 
talent;  for  if  you  are  beaten,  even  in  the 
midst  of  your  magazines  and  your  com- 
munications, wo  to  the  vanquished! 

NOTE. 

"We   should    make   war,"   says   Marshal 
Saxe,  "without  leaving  anything  to  hazard, 


76  napoleon's 

and  in  this  especially  consists  the  talent  of  a 
general.  But  when  we  have  incurred  the 
risk  of  a  battle,  we  should  know  how  to 
profit  by  the  victory,  and  not  merely  con- 
tent ourselves,  according  to  custom,  with 
possession  of  the  field.'^ 

It  was  by  neglecting  to  follow  up  the  first 
success,  that  the  Austrian  army,  after  gain- 
ing the  field  of  Marengo,  saw  itself  compelled 
on  the  following  day  to  evacuate  the  whole 
of  Italy. 

General  Melas,  observing  the  French  in 
retreat,  left  the  direction  of  the  movements 
of  his  army  to  the  chief  of  his  staff,  and 
retired  to  Alexandria  to  repose  from  the 
fatigues  of  the  day.  Colonel  Zach,  equally 
convinced  with  his  general  that  the  French 
army  was  completely  broken,  and  consisted 
only  of  fugitives,  formed  the  divisions  in 
column  of  route. 

By  this  arrangement,  the  imperial  army 
prepared  to  enter  upon  its  victorious  march 
in  a  formation  not  less  than  three  miles  in 
depth. 

It  was  near  four  o'clock  when  General 
Desaix  rejoined  the  French  army  with  his 
division.  His  presence  restored  in  some 
degree  an  equality  between  the  contending 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  77 

forces;  and  yet  Napoleon  hesitated  for  a 
moment  whether  to  resume  the  offensive, 
or  to  make  use  of  this  corps  to  secure  his 
retreat.  The  ardor  of  the  troops  to  return 
to  the  charge,  decided  his  irresohition.  He 
rode  rapidly  along  the  front  of  his  divisions, 
and  addressing  the  soldiers — 'MVe  have  re- 
tired far  enough  for  to-day,"  said  he;  ^'you 
know  i  always  sleep  upon  the  field  of 
battle  !" 

The  army,  with  unanimous  shout,  pro- 
claimed to  him  a  promise  of  victory.  Napo- 
leon resumed  the  offensive.  The  Austrian 
advance  guard,  panic-struck  at  the  sight  of 
a  formidable  and  unbroken  body  presenting 
itself  suddenly  at  a  point  where,  a  few  mo- 
ments before,  only  fugitives  were  to  be  seen, 
went  to  the  right  about,  and  carried  disorder 
into  the  mass  of  its  columns.  Attacked  im- 
mediatel}^  afterward,  with  impetuosity,  in  its 
front  and  flanks,  the  Austrian  army  was 
completely  routed. 

Marshal  Daun  experienced  nearly  the 
same  fate  as  General  Melas,  at  the  battle 
of  Torgau,  in  the  campaign  of  1760. 

The  position  of  the  Austrian  army  was 
excellent.  It  had  its  left  upon  Torgau,  its 
right  on  the  plateau  of  Siptitz,  and  its  front 
covered  by  a  large  sheet  of  water. 


78  napoleon's 

Frederick  proposed  to  turn  its  right  in 
order  to  make  an  attack  upon  the  rear.  For 
this  purpose  he  divided  his  arm}''  into  two 
corps,  the  one  under  the  orders  of  Ziethen, 
witli  instructions  to  attack  in  front,  follow- 
ing the  edge  of  the  water;  the  other  under 
his  own  immediate  command,  with  which  he 
set  out  to  turn  the  right  of  the  Austrians. 
But  Marshal  Daun  having  had  intimation  of 
the  movements  of  the  enemy,  changed  his 
front  by  countermarching,  and  w^as  thus 
enabled  to  repel  the  attacks  of  Frederick, 
whom  he  obliged  to  retreat.  The  two  corps 
of  the  Prussian  army  had  been  acting  with- 
out communication.  Ziethen,  in  the  mean- 
time, hearing  the  fire  recede,  concluded  that 
the  king  had  been  beaten,  and  commenced  a 
movement  by  his  left  in  order  to  rejoin  himj 
but  falling  in  with  two  battalions  of  the 
reserve,  the  Prussian  general  profited  by  this 
reinforcement  to  resume  the  offensive.  Ac- 
cordingly he  renowned  the  attack  with  vigor, 
got  possession  of  the  plateau  of  Siptitz,  and 
soon  after  of  the  wdiole  field  of  battle.  The 
sun  had  already  set  when  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia received  the  news  of  this  unexpected 
good  fortune.  He  returned  in  all  haste,  took 
advantage  of  the  night  to  restore  order  in 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  79 

his  disorganized  army,  and  the  day  after  the 
battle  occupied  Torgan. 

Marshal  Daun  was  receiving  congratula- 
tions upon  his  victory,  when  he  heard  that 
the  Prussians  had  resumed  the  offensive. 
He  immediately  commanded  a  retreat,  and 
at  daybreak  the  Austrians  repassed  the  Elbe 
with  the  loss  of  twelve  thousand  men,  eight 
thousand  prisoners,  and  forty-five  pieces  of 
cannon. 

After  the  battle  of  Marengo,  General  Mê- 
las, although  in  the  midst  of  his  fortresses 
and  magazines,  saw  himself  compelled  to 
abandon  everything,  in  order  to  save  the 
wreck  of  his  army. 

General  Mack  capitulated  after  the  battle 
of  Ulm,  although  in  the  centre  of  his  own 
country. 

The  Prussians,  in  spite  of  their  depots 
and  reserves,  were  obliged,  after  the  battle 
of  Jena,  and  the  French  after  that  of  Wa- 
terloo, to  lay  down  their  arms. 

Hence,  we  may  conclude  that  the  misfor- 
tune that  results  from  the  loss  of  a  battle, 
does  not  consist  so  much  in  the  destruction 
of  men  and  of  materiel  as  in  the  discourage- 
mentrwhich  follows  this  disaster.  The  cour- 
age and  confidence  of  the  victors  augment 


80  napoleon's 

in  proportion  as  those  of  the  vanquished 
diminish;  and  whatever  may  be  the  resources 
of  an  army,  it  will  be  found  that  a  retreat 
will  degenerate  rapidly  into  a  rout  unless 
the  general-in-chief  shall  succeed,  by  com- 
bining boldness  wjth  skill,  and  perseverance 
with  firmness,  in  restoring  the  morale  of  his 
army. 


MAXIM   XXXII. 

The  duty  of  an  advanced  guard  does 
not  consist  in  advancing  or  retiring,  but 
in  manoeuvring.  An  advanced  guard 
should  be  composed  of  light  cavalry,  sup- 
ported by  a  reserve  of  heavy  cavalry,  and 
by  battalions  of  infantry,  supported  also 
by  artillery.  An  advanced  guard  should 
consist  of  picked  troops,  and  the  general 
officers,  officers  and  men,  should  be  se- 
lected for  their  respective  capabilities  and 
knowledge.  A  corps  deficient  in  instruc- 
tion is  only  an  embarrassment  to  an  ad- 
vanced guard. 

NOTE. 

It  was  the  opinion  of  Frederick  that  an 
advanced  guard  should  be  composed  of  de- 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  81 

tachments  of  troops  of  all  arms.  The  com- 
mander should  possess  skill  in  the  choice  of 
ground,  and  he  should  take  care  to  be  in- 
stantly informed,  by  means  of  >  numerous 
patrols,  of  everything  passing  in  the  enemy's 
camp. 

In  war,  it  is  not  the  business  of  an  ad- 
vanced guard  to  fight,  but  to  observe  the 
enemy,  in  order  to  cover  the  movements  of 
the  army.  When  in  pursuit,  the  advanced 
guard  should  charge  with  vigor,  and  cut  off 
the  baggage  and  insulated  corps  of  the  retir- 
ing enemy.  For  this  purpose,  it  should  be 
reinforced  with  all  the  disposable  light  cav- 
alry of  the  army. 


MAXIM   XXXIII. 

It  is  contrary  to  the  usages  of  war  to 
allow  parks  or  batteries  of  artillery  to 
enter  a  defile,  unless  you  hold  the  other 
extremity.  In  case  of  retreat,  the  guns 
will  embarrass  your  movements  and  be 
lost.  They  should  be  left  in  position, 
under  a  sufficient  escort,  until  you  are 
master  of  the  opening. 


82  napolkon's 


NOTE. 

JSTotliing  encumbers  the  march  of  an  army 
so  much  as  a  quantity  of  baggage.  In  the 
campaign  of  1796,  Napoleon  abandoned  his 
battering  train  under  the  walls  of  Mantua, 
after  spiking  the  guns  and  destroying  the 
carriages.  By  this  sacrifice,  he  acquired  a 
facility  of  manœuvring  rapidly  his  little 
army,  and  obtained  the  initiative  as  well  as 
a  general  superiority  over  the  numerous  but 
divided  forces  of  Marshal  Wurmser. 

In  1799,  during  his  retreat  in  Italy,  Gen- 
eral Moreau  being  comj^elled  to  manœuvre 
among  the  mountains,  preferred  separating 
himself  entirely  from  his  reserve  artillery, 
which  lie  directed  upon  France  by  the  Col 
de  Fenestrelle,  rather  than  embarrass  his 
march  with  this  part  of  his  equipment. 

These  are  the  examples  we  should  follow; 
for  if,  by  a  rapidity  of  march,  and  a  facility 
of  concentration  upon  decisive  points,  the 
victory  is  gained,  the  materiel  of  an  army  is 
soon  re-established.  But  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  are  beaten  and  compelled  to  retreat, 
it  will  be  difficult  to  save  our  equipments, 
and  we   may  have   reason    to   congratulate 


MAXIMS    OF.  WAR. 


ourselves  that  we  abandoned  them  in  time 
to  prevent  them  from  augmenting  the  tro- 
phies of  the  enemy. 


MAXIM     XXXIV. 

It  should  be  laid  down  as  a  principle, 
never  to  leave  intervals  bv  which  the  ene- 
my  can  penetrate  between  corps  formed 
in  order  of  battle,  unless  it  be  to  draw 
him  into  a  snare. 

NOTE. 

In  the  campaign  of  1757,  tlie  Prince  of 
Lorraine,  who  was  covering  Prague  with 
the  Austrian  arm}^  perceived  the  Prussians 
threatening,  by  a  flank  movement,  to  turn 
his  right.  He  immediately  ordered  a  partial 
change  of  front  by  tlirowing  back  the  infan- 
try of  that  wing,  so  as  to  form  a  right  angle 
with  the  rest  of  the  line.  But  this  manœu- 
vre being  executed  in  presence  of  the  enemy, 
was  not  effected  witliout  some  disorder. 
The  heads  of  the  columns  having  marched 
too  quick,  caused  the  rear  to  lengthen  out, 
and  when  the  line  was  formed  to  the  right, 
a  large  interval  appeared  at  the  salient  an- 


84  napoleon's 

gle,  Frederick,  observing  tliis  error,  hasten- 
ed to  take  advantage  of  it.  He  directed  his 
centre  corps,  commanded  by  the  Duke  of 
Bevern,  to  throw  itself  into  this  opening, 
and  by  this  manœuvre  decided  the  fate  of 
the  battle. 

The  Prince  of  Lorraine  returned  to  Prague, 
beaten  and  pursued,  with  the  loss  of  sixteen 
thousand  men  and  two  hundred  pieces  of 
cannon. 

It  should  be  observed  at  the  same  time, 
that  this  operation  of  throwing  a  corps  into 
the  intervals  made  by  an  army  in  time  of 
battle,  should  never  be  attempted  unless  you 
are  at  least  equal  in  force,  and  have  an  op- 
portunity of  outflanking  the  enemy  on  the 
one  side  or  the  othei'  ;  for  it  is  then  only  you 
can  hope  to  divide  his  army  in  the  centre, 
and  insulate  the  wings  entirely.  If  you  are 
inferior  in  number,  you  run  the  risk  of  be- 
ing stopped  by  the  reverses,  and  overpower- 
ed by  the  enemy's  wings,  which  may  deploy 
upon  your  flanks  and  surround  you. 

It  was  by  this  manœuvre  that  the  Duke  of 
Berwick  gained  the  battle  of  Almanza,  in 
the  year  1707,  in  Spain.' 

The  Anglo -Portuguese  army,  under  the 
command  of  Lord  Galloway,  came  to  invest 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  85 

Villena.  Marshal  Berwick,  who  commanded 
the  French  and  Spanish  army,  quitted  liis 
camp  at  Montalegre,  and  moved  upon  this 
town  to  raise  the  siepje.  At  liis  approach, 
the  English  general,  eager  to  fight  a  battle, 
advanced  to  meet  him  in  the  plains  of  Al-  . 
manza.  The  issue  was  long  doubtful.  The 
first  line,  commanded  b}"  the  Duke  of  Popoli, 
having  been  broken,  the  Chevalier  d'Asfeldt, 
who  had  charge  of  the  second,  drew  up  his 
masses  with  large  intervals  between  them  ; 
and  when  the  English,  who  were  in  pursuit 
of  the  first  line,  reached  these  reserves,  he 
took  advantage  of  their  disorder  to  attack 
them  in  flank  and  defeated  them  entirely. 

Marshal  Berwick,  perceiving  the  success 
of  this  manœuvre,  threw  open  his  front,  and 
deploying  upon  the  enemy's  flanks,  while 
the  reserve  sustained  the  attack  in  front, 
and  the  cavalry  manoeuvred  in  their  rear, 
obtained  a  complete  victory. 

Lord  Gallowa}^,  wounded  and  pursued, 
collected  with  difliculty  the  remains  of  his 
army,  and  took  shelter  with  them  in  Tor- 
tosa. 

8 


86  napoleon's 

MAXIM    XXXV. 

Encampments  of  tlie  same  army  should 
♦  always  be  formed  so  as  to  protect  each 
other. 

NOTE. 

At  the  battle  of  Dresden,  in  the  campaign 
of  1813,  the  camp  of  the  allies,  although  ad- 
vantageously placed  upon  the  heights  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Elbe,  was  nevertheless 
extremely  defective,  from  being  traversed 
longitudinally  by  a  deep  ravine,  which  sepa- 
rated the  left  wing  completely  from  the  cen- 
tre and  the  right.  This  vicious  arrangement 
did  not  escape  the  penetrating  eye  of  Napo- 
leon. He  instantly  directed  the  whole  of 
his  cavalry  and  two  corps  of  infantry  against 
the  insulated  wing,  attacked  it  with  suj^erior 
numbers,  overthrew  it,  and  took  ten  thou- 
sand prisoners,  before  it  was  possible  to 
come  to  its  support. 


MAXIM    XXXVI. 

When  the  enemy's  arni}^  is  covered  by 
a  river,  upon  which  he  holds  several  tètes 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  87 

de  pont,  do  not  attack  in  front.  This 
.would  divide  jour  force  and  expose  you 
to  be  turned.  Approach  the  river  in 
echelon  of  columns,  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  leading  column  shall  be  the  only 
one  the  enemj^  can  attack,  without  offer- 
ing you  his  iiank.  In  the  meantime,  let 
your  light  troops  occupy  the  bank,  and 
when  you  have  decided  on  the  point  of 
passage,  rush  upon  it  and  fling  across 
your  bridge.  Observe  that  the  point  of 
passage  should  be  always  at  a  distance 
from  the  loading  echelon,  in  order  to  de- 
ceive the  enemy. 

NOTE. 

If  you  occnp3"  a  town  or  a  village  on  the 
bank  of  a  river,  opposite  to  tliat  held  by  the 
enemy,  it  is  an  advantage  to  make  this  spot 
the  crossing  point,  because  it  is  easier  to 
cover  your  carriages  and  reserve  artillery, 
as  well  as  to  mask  the  construction  of  y  oar 
bridge,  in  a  town,  than  in  the  open  country. 
It  is  also  a  great  advantage  to  pass  a  river 
opposite  a  village,  when  the  latter  is  only 
weakly  occupied  by  the  enemy  ;  because  as 
soon    as   the   advanced   guard   reaches   the 


88  napoleon's 

other  side,  it  carries  this  post,  makes  a  lodg- 
ment, and  by  throwing  up  a  few  defensive 
works,  converts  it  easily  into  a  tête  de  pont. 
By  this  means,  the  rest  of  the  army  is  en- 
abled to  effect  the  passage  with  facility. 


MAXIM    XXXVII. 

From  the  moment  you  are  master  of  a 
position  which  commands  the  opposite 
bank,  facilities  are  acquired  for  effecting 
the  passage  of  the  river;  above  all,  if  this 
position  is  sufficiently  extensive  to  place 
upon  it  artillery  in  force.  This  advantage 
is  diminished,  if  the  river  is  more  than 
three  hundred  toises  (or  six  hundred 
3^ards)  in  breadth,  because  the  distance 
being  out  of  the  range  of  grape,  it  is  easy 
for  the  troops  which  defend  the  passage 
to  line  the  bank  and  get  under  cover. 
Hence  it  follows  that  if  the  grenadiers, 
ordered  to  pass  the  river  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  bridge,  should  reach  the  other 
side,  they  would  be  destroyed  by  the 
fire  of  the  enemy;  because  his  batteries, 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  89 

placed  at  the  distance  of  two  hundred 
toises  from  the  landing,  are  capahle  of  a 
most  destructive  efiect,  although  removed 
above  five  hundred  toises  from  the  bat- 
teries of  the  crossing  force.  Thus  the 
advantage  of  the  artillery  would  be  ex- 
clusively his.  For  the  same  i%ason,  the 
passage  is  impracticable,  unless  you  suc- 
ceed in  surprising  the  enemy,  and  are 
protected  by  an  intermediate  island,  or, 
unless  you  are  able  to  take  advantage  of 
an  angle  in  the  river,  to  establish  a  cross- 
fire upon  his  works.  In  this  case,  the 
island  or  angle  forms  a  natural  tete  de  pont, 
and  gives  the  advantage  in  artillery  to 
the  attacking  army.        , 

When  a  river  is  less  than  sixty  toises 
(or  one  hundred  and  twenty  yards)  in 
breadth,  and  you  have  a  post  upon  the 
other  side,  the  troops  which  are  thrown 
across  derive  such  advantages  from  tlie 
protection  of  your  artillery,  that,  however 
small  the  angle  may  be,  it  is  impossible 
for  the  enemy  to  prevent  the  establish- 
ment of  a  bridge.  In  this  case,  the  most 
skilful  2;enerals,  when  they  have  discovt^r- 


90  napoleon's 

ed  the  project  of  their  adversary,  and 
brought  their  own  army  to  the  point  of 
crossing,  usually  content  themselves  with 
opposing  the  passage  of  the  bridge,  by 
forming  a  semicircle  round  its  extremity, 
as  round  the  opening  of  a  defile,  and  re- 
moving to  the  distance  of  three  or  four 
hundred  toises  from  the  fire  of  the  oppo- 
site side. 

NOTE. 

Frederick  observes,  that  '^the  passage  of 
great  rivers  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy  is 
one  of  the  most  delicate  operations  in  war." 
Success  on  these  occasions  depends  on  se- 
crecy, on  the  rapidity  of  the  manœuvres, 
and  the  punctual  execution  of  the  orders 
given  for  the  movements  of  each  division. 
To  pass  such  an  obstacle  in  presence  of  an 
enemy,  and  without  his  knowledge,  it  is 
necessary  not  only  that  the  previous  dispo- 
sitions should  be  well  conceived,  but  that 
they  should  be  executed  without  confusion. 

In  the  campaign  of  1705,  Prince  Eugene, 
of  Savoy,  wishing  to  come  to  the  assistance 
of  the  Prince  of  Piedmont,  sought  for  a 
favorable  point  at  which  to  force  the  passage 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  91 

of  the  Adda,  defended  at  that  time  by  the 
French  army,  under  the  command  of  the 
Duke  de  Vendôme. 

After  havinij:  selected  an  advantao^eous 
situation,  Prince  Eugene  erected  a  battery 
of  twenty  pieces  of  cannon  on  a  position 
which  commanded  the  entire  of  the  opposite 
bank,  and  covered  his  infantry  by  a  line  of 
entrenched  parallels  constructed  on  the 
slope  of  the  declivity. 

The}"  were  working  vigorously  at  the 
bridge,  wlien  the  Duke  de  Vendôme  appeared 
with  his  whole  army.  At  first  he  seemed 
determined  to  opj^ose  its  construction,  but 
after  having  examined  the  position  of  Prince 
Eugene,  he  judged  this  to  be  impracticable. 

He  therefore  placed  his  army  out  of  reach 
of  the  prince's  batteries,  resting  both  his 
wings  upon  the  river,  so  as  to  form  a  bow^, 
of  which  the  Adda  was  the  cord  He  then 
covered  himself  with  eti trench ments  and 
abattis,  and  was  thus  enabled  to  charge  the 
enem3''s  columns  whenever  they  debouched 
from  the  bridge,  and  to  beat  them  in  detail. 

Eugene,  having  reconnoitred  the  position 
of  the  French,  considered  the  passage  im- 
possible. He  therefore  withdrew  the  bridge, 
and  broke  up  his  camp  during  the  night. 


92  napoleon's 

It  was  by  this  manœuvre,  also,  that,  in  the 
campaign  of  1809,  the  Archduke  Charles 
compelled  the  French  to  reoccupy  the  isle 
of  Lobau,  after  having  debouched  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Danube.  The  march  of  the 
Archduke  Charles  was  wholly  concentric. 
He  menaced  Grosaspern  with  his  right,  Es- 
ling  with  his  centre,  and  Enzersdorf  with 
his  left. 

His  army,  with  both  wings  resting  on  the 
Danube,  formed  a  semicircle  around  Esling. 
Napoleon  immediately  attacked  and  broke 
the  centre  of  the  Austrians;  but  after  hav. 
ing  forced  their  first  line,  he  found  himself 
arrested  by  the  reserves.  In  the  meantime, 
the  bridges  upon  the  Danube  had  been  de- 
stroyed, and  several  of  his  corps,  with  their 
parks  of  artillery,  were  still  on  the  right 
bank.  This  disappointment,  joined  to  the 
favorable  position  of  the  Austrians,  decided 
Napoleon  to  re-enter  the  isle  of  Lobau,  where 
he  had  previously  constructed  a  line  of  field- 
works,  so  as  to  give  it  all  the  advantages  of 
a  well  entrenched  camp. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  93 

MAXIM    XXXVIII. 

It  is  difficult  to  prevent  an  enemy, 
supplied  with  pontoons,  from  crossing 
a  river.  When  the  object  of  an  army, 
which  defends  the  passage,  is  to  cover  a 
siege,  the  moment  the  general  has  ascer- 
tained his  inability  to  oppose  the  passage, 
he  should  take  measures  to  arrive  before 
the  enemy,  at  an  intermediate  position 
between  the  river  he  defends  and  the 
place  he  desires  to  cover. 

NOTE. 

Here  we  may  observe,  that  this  inter- 
mediate position  should  be  reconnoitred,  or 
rather,  well  entrenched  beforehand;  for  the 
enemy  will  be  unable  to  make  an  often sive 
movement  against  the  corps  emplo^^ed  in 
the  siege,  until' he  has  beaten  the  army  of 
observation;  and  the  latter,  under  cover  of 
its  camp,  may  always  await  a  favorable 
opportunity  to  attack  him  in  flank  or  in 
rear. 

Besides,  the  army  which  is  once  entrenched 
in  this  manner,  has  the  advantasre  of  beinc: 


94  napoleon's 

concentrated;  while  that  of  the  enemy  must 
act  in  detachments,  if  he  wishes  to  cover  his 
bridge,  and  watch  the  movements  of  the 
army  of  observation,  so  as  to  enable  him  to 
attack  the  besieging  corps  in  its  lines,  with- 
out being  exposed  to  an  attempt  on  his  rear, 
or  being  menaced  with  the  loss  of  his  bridge. 


MAXIM     XXXIX. 

In  the  campaign  of  1645,  Turenn'e  was 
attacked  w^ith  his  army  before  Pliilipsburg 
by  a  very  superior  force.  There  was  no 
bridge  here  over  the  Rhine,  but  he  took 
advantage  of  the  ground  between  the  river 
and  the  place  to  establish  his  camp.  This 
should  serve  as  a  lesson  to  engineer  offi- 
cers, not  merely  in  the  construction  of  for- 
tresses, but  of  teies  de  pont.  A  space  should 
always  be  left  between  the  fortress  and 
the  river,  where  an  army  may  form  and 
rally  without  being  obliged  to  throw, itself 
into  the  place,  and  thereby  compromise 
its  security.  An  army  retiring  upon  May- 
ence  before  a  pursuing  enemy,  is  necessa- 
rily compromised;  for  this  reason,  because 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  95 

it  requires  more  than  a  day  to  pass  the 
bridge,  and  because  the  lines  of  Cassel  are 
too  confined  to  admit  an  army  to  remain 
there  without  being  blocked  up.  Two 
hundred  toises  should  have  been  left  be- 
tween that  place  and  the  Rhine.  It  is 
essential  that  all  tetcs  de  pont  before  great 
great  rivers  should  be  constructed  upon 
this  principle,  otherwise  they  will  prove  a 
very  inefficient  assistance  to  protect  the 
passage  of  a  retreating  army.  Tetes  de 
pont,  as  laid  down  in  our  schools,  are  of 
use  only  for  small  rivers,  the  -passage  of 
which  is  comparatively  short. 

NOTE. 

Marshal  Saxe,  in  the  campaign  of  1741, 
having  passed  the  Moldau  in  quest  of  a  de- 
tached corps  of  fourteen  thousand  men,  which 
was  about  to  throw  itself  into  Prague,  left  a 
thousand  infantry  upon  that  river,  Avitii  or- 
ders to  entrench  themselves  upon  a  height 
directly  opposite  the  tête  de  pont.  By  this 
precaution,  the  marshal  secured  his  retreat, 
and  also  the  facility  of  repassing  the  bridge 
without  disorder,  by  rallying  his  divisions 
between  the  entrenched  height  and  the  tête 
de  pont. 


96  napoleon's 

Were  these  examples  llnkno^Yn  to  the  gen- 
erals of  modern  times,  or  are  they  disposed 
to  think  such  precautions  superfluous  ? 


MAXIM    XL. 

Fortresses  are  equally  useful  in  offen- 
sive and  defensive  warfare.  It  is  true, 
they  will  not  in  themselves  arrest  an 
army,  but  they  are  an  excellent  means  of 
retarding,  embarrassing,  weakening  and 
annoying  a  victorious  enemy. 

NOTE. 

The  brilliant  success  of  the  allied  armies  in 
the  campaign  of  1814,  has  given  to  many 
military  men  a  false  idea  of  the  real  value  of 
fortresses. 

The  formidable  bodies  which  crossed  the 
Bhine  and  the  Alps  at  this  period,  were  en- 
abled to  spare  large  detachments  to  blockade 
the  strong  places  that  covered  the  frontiers 
of  France,  without  materially  aifecting  the 
numerical  superiority  of  the  army  which 
marched  upon  the  capital.     This  army  was 


^  MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  97 

in  a  condition,  therefore,  to  act,  without  the 
fear  of  being  menaced  in  its  line  of  retreat. 
But  at  no  period  of  military  history  were 
the  armies  of  Europe  so  combined  before,  or 
.governed  so  entirely  by  one  common  mind  in 
the  attainment  of  a  single  object.  Under 
these  circumstances,  the  line  of  fortresses 
which  surround  France  was  rendered  un- 
available during  the  campaign;  but  it  would 
be  very  imprudent,  therefore,  to  conclude 
that  a  frontier  guarded  by  numerous  for- 
tresses may  be  passed  with  impunity  ;  or 
that  battles  may  be  fought  with  these  places 
in  your  rear,  without  previously  besieging, 
or  at  least  investing  them  with  sufficient 
forces. 


MAXIM    XLI. 

There  are  only  two  ways  of  insuring  the 
success  of  a  siege.  The  first,  to  tegin  by 
beating  the  enemy's  array  employed  to 
cover  the  place,  forcing  it  out  of  the  field, 
and  throwing  its  remains  beyond  some 
great  natural  obstacle,  such  as  a  chain  of 
mountains,  or  large  river.  Having  accom- 
9 


98  napoleon's 

plished  this  object,  an  army  of  observa- 
tion should  be  placed  behind  the  natural 
obstacle,  until  the  trenches  are  finished 
and  the  place  taken. 

But  if  it  be  desired  to  take  the  place  in 
presence  of  a  relieving  army,  without  risk- 
ing a  battle,  then  the  whole  materiel  and 
equipment  for  a  siege  are  necessary  to 
begin  with,  together  with  ammunition  and 
provisions  for  the  presumed  period  of  its 
duration,  and  also  lines  of  contravallation 
and  circumvallation,  aided  by  all  the  lo- 
calities of  heights,  woods,  marshes  and 
inundations.  ^ 

Having  no  longer  occasion  to  keep  up 
communications  with  your  depots,  it  is 
now  only  requisite  to  hold  in  check  the 
relieving  army.  For  this  purpose,  an  army 
of  observation  should  be  formed,  whose 
business  it  is  never  to  lose  sight  of  that  of 
the  enemy,  and  which,  while  it  effectually 
bars  all  access  to  the  place,  has  always 
time  enough  to  arrive  upon  his  flanks  or 
rear  in  case  he  should  attempt  to  steal  a 
march. 
'  It  is  to  be  remembered,  too,  that  by 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  99 

profiting  judiciously  by  the  lines  of  con- 
travallation,  a  portion  of  the  besieging 
army  will  always  be  available  in  giving 
battle  to  the  approaching  enemy. 

Upon  the  same  general  principle,  when 
a  place  is  to  be  besieged  in  presence  of  an 
enemy's  army,  it  is  necessary  to  cover  the 
siege  by  lines  of  circumvallation. 

If  the  besieging  force  is  of  numerical 
strength  enough  (after  leaving  a  corps 
before  the  place  four  times  the  amount 
of  the  garrison)  to  cope  with  the  reliev- 
ing army,  it  may  remove  more  than  one 
day's  march  from  the  place  ;  but  if  it  be 
inferior  in  numbers  after  providing  for 
the  siege,  as  above  stated,  it  should  re- 
main only  a  short  day's  march  from  the 
spot,  in  order  to  fall  back  upon  its  lines, 
if  necessary,  or  receive  succor  in  case  of 
attack. 

If  the  investing  corps  and  army  of 
observation  are  onl}^  equal  when  united 
to  the  relieving  force,  the  besieging  army 
should  remain  entire  w^ithin,  or  near  its 
lines,  and  push  the  w^orks  and  the  siege 
with  the  greatest  activity. 


100  napoleon's 


NOTE. 

"■  When  we  undertake  a  siege,"  says  Mon- 
técucuUi,  "  we  should  not  seek  to  place  our- 
selves opposite  the  weakest  part  of  the  for- 
tress, but  at  the  point  most  favorable  for 
establishing  a  camp  and  executing  the  de- 
sie'ns  we  have  in  view." 

This  maxim  was  well  understood  by  the 
Duke  of  Berwick.  Sent  to  form  the  siege  of 
Nice  in  1706,  he  determined  to  attack  on  the 
side  of  Montalban,  contrarj^  to  the  advice  of 
Yanban,  and  even  to  the  orders  of  the  king. 
Having  a  very  small  army  at  his  disposal, 
he  began  by  securing  his  camjD.  This  he  did 
by  constructing  redoubts  upon  the  heights 
that  shut  in  the  space  between  the  Yar  and 
the  Paillon,  two  rivers  which  supported  his 
flanks.  By  this  means,  he  protected  himself 
against  a  surprise;  for  the  Duke  of  Savoy, 
having  the  power  of  debouching  suddenly 
by  the  Col  de  Tende,  it  was  necessary  that 
the  marshal  should  be  enabled  to  assemble 
his  forces,  so  as  to  move  rapidty  upon  his 
adversary,  and  fight  him  before  he  got  into 
position  ;  otherwise  his  inferiority  in  num- 
bers would  have  obliged  him  to  raise  the 
siege. 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  101 

When  Marshal  Saxe  was  besieging  Brus- 
sels, with  only  twenty-eight  thousand  men, 
opposed  to  a  garrison  of  twelve  thousand, 
he  received  intelligence  that  the  Prince  of 
Waldeck  was  assembling  his  forces  to  raise 
the  siege.  Not  being  strong  enough  to  form 
an  army  of  observation,  the  marshal  recon- 
noitred a  field  of  battle  on  the  little  river  Vol- 
uve,  and  made  all  the  necessary  dispositions 
for  moving  rapidly  to  the  spot,  in  case  of 
the  approach  of  the  enemy.  By  this  means 
he  was  prepared  to  receive  his  adversary 
without  discontinuing  the  operations  of  the 
siege. 

MAXIM    XLII. 

Feuquiere  says  that  "  we  should  never 
wait  for  the  enemy  in  the  lines  of  circum- 
vallation,  but  we  sîioulcl  go  out  and  attack 
him."  He  is  in  error.  There  is  no  au- 
thority in  war  without  exception  ;  and  it 
would  be  dangerous  to  proscribe  the  prin- 
ciple of  awaiting  the  enemy  within  the 
lines  of  circumvallation. 

NOTE. 

During  the  siege  of  Mons,  in  1691,  the 
Prince  of  Orange  assembled  his  army,  and 


102  napoleon's 

advanced  as  far  as  Notre  Dame  de  Ilalle, 
making  a  demonstration  to  succor  the  place. 
Louis  Xiy,  who  commanded  the  siege  in 
person,  called  a  council  of  war  to  deliberate 
on  what  w^as  to  be  done  in  case  the  Prince 
of  Orange  approached.  The  opinion  of 
Marshal  Luxembourg  was  to  remain  within 
the  lines  of  circumvallation,  and  that  opin- 
ion prevailed. 

The  marshal  laid  it  down  as  a  principle 
that,  when  the  besieging  army  is  not  strong 
enough  to  defend  the  wdiole  extent  of  cir- 
cumvallation, it  should  quit  the  lines  and 
advance  to  meet  the  enemy;  but  when  it  is 
strong  enough  to  encamp  in  tw^o  lines  around 
a  place,  that  it  is  better  to  profit  by  a  good 
entrenchment — more  especially  as  by  this 
means  the  siege  is  not  interrupted. 

In  1658,  Marshal  Turenne  was  besieging 
Dunkirk.  He  had  already  opened  the 
trenches,  when  the  Spanish  army,  under 
the  orders  of  the  Prince  Don  Juan,  Condé, 
and  D'Hocquincourt,  appeared  in  sight,  and 
took  post  upon  the  Downs,  at  a  distance  of 
a  leaa'ue  from  his  lines.  Turenne  had  the 
superiority  in  numbers,  and  he  determined 
to  quit  his  entrenchments.  lie  had  other 
advantages  also.      The  enemy  was  without 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  103 

artillery,  and  their  superiority  in  cavalry 
was  rendered  useless  by  the  unfavorable 
nature  of  the  ground.  It  was,  therefore,  of 
groat  importance  to  beat  the  Spanish  army 
before  it  had  time  to  entrench  itself  and 
bring  up  its  artillery.  The  victor}^  gained 
by  the  French  on  this  occasion  justified  all 
the  combinations  of  Marshal  Turenne. 

When  Marshal  Berwick  was  laying  siege 
to  Pliilipsburgh,  in  1733,  he  had  reason  to 
apprehend  that  the  Prince  of  Savoy  would 
attack  hira  with  all  the  forces  of  the  emj)ire 
before  its  termination.  The  marshal,  there- 
fore, after  having  made  his  disposition  of 
the  troops  intended  for  the  siege,  formed, 
with  the  rest  of  his  army,  a  corps  of  observ- 
ation to  make  head  against  Prince  Eugene, 
in  case  the  latter  should  choose  to  attack 
him  in  his  lines,  or  attempt  a  diversion  on 
the  Moselle  or  Uj^per  Rhine.  Prince  Eu- 
gene, having  arrived  in  front  of  the  besieg- 
ing army,  some  general  officers  were  of 
opinion  that  it  was  better  not  to  await  the 
enemy  in  the  lines,  but  to  move  forward 
and  attack  him.  But  Marshal  Berwick,  who 
agreed  with  the  Duke  of  Luxembourg,  that 
an  army  which  can  occupy,  completely,  good 
entrenchments  is  not  liable  to  be  forced,  per- 


104  napoleon's 

sisted  in  remaining  within  his  works.  The 
result  proved  that  this  was  also  the  opinion-  of 
Prince  Eugene,  for  he  did  not  dare  to  attack 
the  entrenchments,  which  ho  would  not  have 
failed  to  do  if  he  had  any  hopes  of  success. 


MAXIM    XLIII. 

Those  who  proscribe  lines  of  circum- 
vallation,  and  all  the  assistance  which  the 
science  of  the  engineer  can  afford,  deprive 
themselves  gratuitously  of  an  auxiliary 
which  is  never  injurious,  almost  always 
useful,  and  often  indispensable.  It  must 
be  admitted,  at  the  same  time,  that  the 
principles  of  field-fortiiication  require  im- 
provement. This  important  branch  of 
the  art  of  war  has  made  no  progress  since 
the  time  of  the  ancients.  It  is  even  in- 
ferior at  this  day  to  what  it  was  two  thou- 
sand years  ago.  Engineer  officers  should 
be  encouraged  in  bringing  this  branch  of 
their  art  to  perfection,  and  in  placing  it 
upon  a  level  with  the  rest. 

NOTE. 

'<  If  we  are  inferior  in  numbers,"  says 
Marshal   Saxe,  ''  entrenchments   are   of  no 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  105 

use,  for  the  enemy  will  bring  all  his  forces 
to  bear  upon  particular  points.  If  we  are 
of  equal  strength  they  are  unnecessary  also. 
If  we  are  superior,  we  do  not  want  them. 
Then  why  give  ourselves  the  trouble  to  en- 
trench ?"  Notwithstanding  this  opinion  of 
the  inutility  of  entrenchments,  Marshal  Saxe 
often  had  recourse  to  them. 

In  1797,  Generals  Provéra  and  Hohenzol- 
lern  having  presented  themselves  before 
Mantua  (where  Marshal  Wurmser  was  shut 
up),  for  the  purpose  of  raising  the  siege, 
they  were  stopi^ed  by  the  lines  of  contraval- 
lation  of  St.  George.  This  slight  obstacle 
sufficed  to  afford  Napoleon  time  to  arrive 
from  Eivoli  and  defeat  their  enterprise.  It 
was  in  consequence  of  neglecting  to  en- 
trench themselves  that  the  French  had  been 
obliged  to  raise  the  siege  in  the  preceding 
campai  c:n. 


MAXIM    XLIY. 

If  circumstances  prevent  a  sufficient 
garrison  being  left  to  defend  a  fortified 
town,  which  contains  an  hospital  and 
magazines,  at  least  every  means  should 


106  napoleon's 

be  employed  to  secure  the  citadel  against 
a  coup  de  main. 

NOTE. 

A  few  battalions  dispersed  about  a  town, 
inspire  no  terror;  but  shut  up  in  the  more 
narrow  outline  of  a  citadel,  they  assume  an 
imposing  attitude.  For  this  reason  it  ap- 
pears to  me  that  such  a  precaution  is  al- 
ways necessary,  not  only  in  fortresses,  but 
wherever  there  are  hospitals  or  depots  of  any 
kind.  Where  there  is  no  citadel,  some  quar- 
ter of  the  town  should  be  fixed  uj^on  most 
favorable  for  defence,  and  entrenched  in  such  , 
a  manner  as  to  oppose  the  greatest  resistance 
possible. 


MAXIM    XLV. 

A  fortified  place  can  only  protect  the 
garrison  and  detain  the  enemy  for  a  cer- 
tain .^time.  When  this  time  has  elapsed, , 
^  and.  the  defences  of  the  place  are  desti^oy- 
ed,  the  garrison  should  lay  down  its  arms. 
All  civilized  nations  are  agreed  on  this 
^oint,  and  there  never  has  been  an  argu- 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  107 

ment  except  with  reference  to  the  greater 
or  less  degree  of  defence  which  a  governor 
is  bound  to  make  before  he  capitulates. 
At  the  same  time,  there  are  generals  — 
Villars  among  the  number — who  are  of 
opinion  that  a  governor  should  never  sur- 
render, but  that  in  the  last  extremity  he 
should  blow  up  the  fortifications,  and  take 
advantage  of  the  night  to  cut  his  way 
through  the  besieging  army.  Where  he 
is  unable  to  blow  up  tUe  fortifications,  he 
may  always  retire,  they  say,  with  his  gar- 
rison, and  save  the  men. 

Officers  w^ho  have  adopted  this  line  of 
conduct,  have  often  brought  off  three- 
fourths  of  their  garrison.  , 

NOTE. 

Ill  1705,  the  French,  wlio  were  besieged  in 
naguenau  by  Count  Thungen,  found  them- 
selves incapable  of  sustaining  an  assault. 
Péri,  the  governor,  who  had  already  dis- 
tinguished himself  by  a  vigorous  defence, 
despairing  of  being  allowed  to  capitulate  on 
any  terms  short  of  becoming  prisoner  of 
war,  resolved  to  abandon  the  place  and  cut 
his  way  through  the  besiegers. 


108  napoleon's 

In  order  to  conceal  his  intention  more 
effectually,  and  while  he  deceived  the  enemy, 
to  sound  at  the  same  time  the  disposition  of 
his  officers,  he  assembled  a  council  of  war 
and  declared  his  resolution  to  die  in  the 
breach.  Then,  under  pretext  of  the  ex- 
tremity to  which  he  was  reduced,  he  com- 
manded the  whole  garrison  under  arms  ;  and 
leaving  only  a  few  sharpshooters  in  the 
breach,  gave  the  order  to  march,  and  set  out 
in  silence,  under  cover  of  the  night,  from 
Haguenau.  This  audacious  enterprise  was 
crowned  with  success,  and  Péri  reached  Sa- 
verne  without  having  suffered  the  smallest 
loss. 

Two  fine  instances  of  defence  in  later  times 
are  those  of  Massena  at  Grenoa,  and  of  Pala- 
fox  at  Saragossa. 

The  first  marched  out  with  arms  and  bag- 
gage, and  all  the  honors  of  war,  after  reject- 
ing every  summons,  and  defending  himself 
until  hunger  alone  compelled  him  to  capitu- 
late. The  second  only  yielded  after  having 
buried  his  garrison  amid  the  ruins  of  the 
city,  which  he  defended  from  house  to  house, 
until  famine  and  death  left  him  no  alter- 
native but  to  surrender.  This  siege,  which 
was  equally  honorable  to ^  the  French  as  to 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  109 

the  Spaniards,  is  one  of  the  most  memorable 
m  the  history  of  war.  In  the  course  of  it, 
i^alafox  displayed  every  possible  resource 
which  coura-e  and  obstinacy  can  supply  in 
the  defence  of  a  fortress. 

AH  real  strength  is  founded  in  the  mind  • 
and  on  this  account  I  am  of  opinion  that  we 
should  be  directed  in  the  choice  of  a  o-ov- 
ernor,  less  by  his  genius  than  his  personal 
character.  His  most  essential  qualities  should 
be  courage,  perseverance,  and  soldierlike  de- 
votedness.     Above  all,  he  should  possess  the 
talent  not  only  of  infusing  courage  into  the 
garrison,  but  of  kindling  a  spirit  of  resistance 
HI  the  whole  population.     Where  the  latter 
IS  wanting,  however  art  may  multiply  the 
defences  of  a  place,  the  garrison  will  be  com- 
pelled  to  capitulate  after  having  sustained 
the  first,  or  at  most,  the  second  assault. 


MAXIM    XLYI. 

The  keys  of  a  fortress  are  well  worth 
tlie  retirement  of  the  garrison,  when  it  is 
resolved  to  yield  only  on  those  conditions. 
On  this  principle  it  is  always  wiser  to 


110  napoleon's 

grant  an  honorable  capitulation  to  a  garri- 
son which  has  made  a  vigorous  resistance, 
than  to  risk  an  assault. 

NOTE. 

Marshal  Yillars  has  justly  obsei'ved,  that 
''no  governor  of  a  place  should  he  permitted 
to  excuse  himself  for  surrendering,  on  the 
ground  of  wishing  to  preserve  the  king's 
troops.  Every  garrison  that  displays  courage 
will  escape  being  prisoners  of  war.  For  there 
is  no  general  who,  however  well  assured  of 
carrying  a  place  by  assault,  will  not  prefer 
granting  terms  of  capitulation  rather  than 
risk  the  loss  of  a  thousand  men  in  forcing 
determined  troops  to  surrender.'' 


MAXIM    XLVII. 

Infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  are  noth- 
ing without  each  other;  therefore,  they 
should  always  be  so  disposed  in  canton- 
ments as  to  assist  each  other  in  case  of 
surprise. 

NOTE. 

^'  A  general,"  says  Frederick,  "  should  di- 
rect his  whole  attention  to  the  tranquility  of 


MAXIMS    OP    WAR.  Ill 

his  cantonments,  in  order  that  the  soldier 
may  be  relieved  from  all  anxiety,  and  repose 
in  security  from  his  flxtigues.  AVith  this 
view,  care  should  be  taken  that  the  troops 
are  able  to  form  rapidly  upon  ground  which 
has  been  previously  reconnoitered  ;  that  the 
generals  remain  always  with  their  divisions 
or  brigades,  and  that  the  service  is  carried 
on  throughout  with  exactness." 

Marshal  Saxe  is  of  opinion  that  an  army 
should  not  be  in  a  hurry  to  quit  its  can- 
tonments, but  that  it  should  wait  till  the 
enemy  has  exhausted  himself  with  march- 
ing, and  be  ready  to  fall  upon  liim  with 
fresh  troops  wlien  he  is  overcome  with 
fatigue. 

I  believe,  however,  that  it  would  be  dan- 
gerous to  trust  implicitly  to  this  high  au- 
thority, for  there  are  many  occasions  where 
all  the  advantage  lies  in  the  initiative,  more 
especially  when  the  enemy  has  been  com- 
pelled to  extend  his  cantonments,  from  scar- 
city of  subsistence,  and  can  be  attacked 
before  he  has  time  to  concentrate  his  foi*ces. 


112  napoleon's 


MAXIM    XLVIII. 

The  formation  of  infantry  in  line  slioulcl 
be  always  in  two  ranks,  because  the 
length  of  the  musket  only  admits  of  an 
effective  fire  in  this  formation.  The  dis- 
chari>:e  of  the  third  rank  is  not  onlv  un- 
certain,  but  frequently  dangerous  to  the 
ranks  in  its  front.  In  drawing  up  infantry 
in  two  ranks,  there  should  be  a  super- 
numerary behind  every  fourth  or  fifth 
file.  A  reserve  should  likewise  be  placed 
twenty-five  paces  in  rear  of  each  fiank. 

• 

NOTE. 

I  am  of  opinion,  if  circumstances  require 
a  line  of  infantry  to  resort  to  a  square,  that 
two  deep  is  too  light  a  formation  to  resist 
the  shock  of  cavahy.  However  useless  the 
third  rank  may  appear  for  the  j)nrpose  of 
file-firing,  it  is,  notwithstanding  necessary, 
in  order  to  replace  the  men  who  fall  in  tire 
ranks  in  front;  otherwise  you  would  be 
obliged  to  close  in  the  files,  and  by  this 
means  leave  intervals  between  the  compa- 
nies, which  the  cavalry   would    not   fail  to 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  113 

penetrate.  It  appears  to  me,  also,  that  when 
infantry  is  formed  in  two  ranks,  the  columns 
will  be  found  to  open  out  in  marching  to  a 
flank.  If  it  should  be  considered  advanta- 
geous behind  entrenchments  to  keep  the  in- 
fantry in  two  raidîs,  the  third  rank  should 
be  placed  in  reserve,  and  brought  forward 
to  relieve  the  front  rank  when  fatigued,  or 
when  the  fire  is  observed  to  slacken.  I  am 
induced  to  make  these  remarks,  because  I 
have  seen  an  excellent  pamphlet  which  pro- 
poses the  two-deep  formation  for  infantry  as 
the  best.  The  author  supports  his  opinion 
by  a  variety  of  plausible  reasons,  but  not 
sufficient,  as  it  appears  to  me,  to  answer  all 
the  objections  that  may  be  offered  to  this 
practice. 


MAXIM    XLIX. 

The  practice  of  mixing  small  bodies  of 
infantry  and  cavalry  together  is  a  bad 
one,  and  attended  with  many  inconveni- 
ences. The  cavalry  loses  its  power  of  ac- 
tion. It  becomes  fettered  in  all  its  move- 
ments. Its  energy  is  destroyed  ;  even 
the  infantry  itself  is  compromised,  for  on 


114  napoleon's 

the  first  movement  of  tlie  cavalry  it  is 
left  without  support.  The  best  mode  of 
protecting  cavahy  is  to  cover  its  flank. 

NOTE. 

This  also  was  the  opinion  of  Marshal 
Saxe.  "■  The  weakness  of  the  above  forma- 
tion/' says  he,  "  is  sufficient  in  itself  to  in- 
timidate the  platoons  of  infantry,  because 
they  must  be  lost  if  the  cavalry  is  beaten." 
The  cavalry,  also,  which  depends  on  the 
infantry  for  succor,  is  disconcerted  the  mo- 
ment a  brisk  forward  movement  carries 
them  out  of  sight  of  their  supports.  Mar- 
shal Turenne,  and  the  generals  of  his  time, 
sometimes  employed  this  order  of  forma- 
tion ;  but-  that  does  not,  in  my  opinion, 
justify  a  modern  author  for  recommending 
it  in  an  essay,  entitled  "  Considerations  sur 
l'Art  de  la  Guerre."  In  fact,  this  formation 
has  long  been  abandoned  ;  and,  since  the  in- 
troduction of  light  artillery,  it  appears  to 
me  almost  ridiculous  to  propose  it. 

MAXIM    L. 

Charges  of  cavalry  are  equally   useful 
at   the  beginning,   the  middle,    and   the 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  115 


end  of  a  battle.  They  slioiild  be  made 
always,  if  possible,  on  the  flanks  of  the 
infantry,  especially  when  the  latter  is  en- 
gaged in  front. 

NOTE. 

The  Archduke  Charles,  in  speaking  of  cav- 
alry, recommends  that  it  shoukl  be  brought 
in  mass  upon  a  decisive  point,  when  the  mo- 
ment for  employing  it  arrives  ;  that  is  to 
say,  when  it  can  attack  with  a  certainty  of 
success.  As  the  rapidity  of  its  movement 
enables  cavahy  to  act  along  the  whole  line 
in  the  same  day,  the  general  who  commands 
it  should  keep  it  together  as  much  as  possi- 
ble, and  avoid  dividing  it  into  many  detach- 
ments. When  the  nature  of  the  ground 
admits  of  cavalry  being  employed  on  all 
points  of  the  line,  it  is  desirable  to  form  it 
in  column  behind  the  infantr}^,  and  in  a  po- 
sition whence  it  may  be  ea-sily  directed 
wherever  it  is  required.  If  cavalry  is  in- 
tended to  cover  a  position,  it  should  be 
placed  sufficiently  in  the  rear  to  meet  at  full 
speed  any  advance  of  troops  coming  to 
attack  that  position.  If  it  is  destined  to 
cover  the  flank  of  the  infantry,  it  should,  for 
the  same  reason,  be  placed  directly  behind 


116  napoleon's  9 

it.  As  the  object  of  cavalry  is  purely  offen- 
sive, it  should  be  a  rule  to  form  it  at  such  a 
distance  only  from  the  point  of  collision  as 
to  enable  it  to  acquire  its  utmost  impulse, 
and  arrive  at  the  top  of  its  speed  into  ac- 
tion. With  respect  to  the  cavalry  reserve, 
this  should  only  be  employed  at  the  end  of 
a  battle,  either  to  render  the  success  more 
decisive,  or  to  cover  the  retreat.  Napoleon 
remarks  that,  at  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  the 
cavalry  of  the  guard  which  composed  the 
reserve,  was  engaged  against  his  orders. 
He  complains  of  having  been  deprived  from 
five  o'clock  of  the  use  of  this  reserve,  which, 
when  well  employed,  had  so  often  insured 
him  the  victory. 


MAXIM    LI. 

It  is  the  business  of  cavalry  to  follow 
up  the  victory,  and  to  prevent  the  beateu 
enemy  from  rallying. 

NOTE. 

Victor  or  vanquished,  it  is  of  the  greatest 
importance  to  have  a  body  of  cavalry  in 
reserve,  either  to  take  advantage  of  victory. 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  117 

or  to  secure  a  retreat.  The  most  decisive 
battles  lose  half  their  value  to  the  conquer- 
or, when  the  want  of  cavalry  prevents  him 
from  following  up  his  success,  and  depriving 
the  enem}^  of  the  power  of  rallying. 

AVhen  a  retiring  army  is  pursued,  it  is 
more  especially  upon  the  flanks  that  the 
weight  of  cavalry  should  fall,  if  you  are 
strong  enough  in  that  arm  to  cut  off  his 
retreat. 


MAXIM    LII. 

Artillery  is  more  essential  to  cavalry 
than  to  infantry,  because  cavalry  lias  no 
fire  for  its  defence,  but  depends  upon  the 
sabre.  It  is  to  remedy  this  deficiency 
that  recourse  has  been  had  to  horse-ar- 
tillery. Cavalry,  thei^efore,  should  never 
be  without  cannon,  whether  when  attack- 
ing, rallying,  or  in  piosition. 

NOTE. 

Horse-artillery  is  an  invention  of  Fred- 
erick. Austria  lost  no  time  in  introducing 
it  into  her  armies,  although  in  an  imperfect 
degree.      It    was    only   in    1702    that    this 


118  napoleon's 

arm  was  adopted   in  France,  where  it  was 
brought  rapidly  to  its  j^resent  perfection. 

The  services  of  this  arm  durini»:  the  wars 
of  the  Revolution  were  immense.  It  may 
be  said  to  have  changed  to  a  certain  extent 
the  character  of  tactics,  because  its  facility 
of  movement  enables  it  to  bear  with  rapidi- 
ty on  every  point  where  artillery  can  be 
employed  with  success.  JSTapoleon  has  re" 
marked  in  his  memoirs  that  a  flanking  bat- 
tery which  strikes  and  rakes  the  enemy 
obliquely,  is  capable  of  deciding  a  victory 
in  itself.  To  this  we  may  add  that,  inde- 
pendent of  the  advantages  wiiich  cavalry 
derives  from  horse-artillery  in  securing  its 
flanks,  and  in  opening  the  way  for  a  suc- 
cessful charge  by  the  destructiveness  of  its' 
fire,  it  is  desirable  that  these  two  arms 
should  never  be  separated,  but  ready  at  all 
times  to  seize  upon* points  w-here  it  may 
be  necessary  to  employ  cannon.  On  these 
occasions,  the  cavalry  masks  the  march  of 
the  artillery,  protects  its  establishment  in 
position,  and  covers  it  from  the  attack  of 
the  enemy,  until  it  is  ready  to  open  its 
fire. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  IIQ 

MAXIM    LIII. 

In  march,  or  in  position,  the  greater 
part  of  the  artillery  should  be  with  the 
divisions  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  The 
rest  should  be  in  reserve.  Each  srun 
should  have  with  it  three  hundred  rounds, 
without  including  the  limber.  This  is 
about   the   complement   for  two    battles. 


NOTE 


The  better  infixntry  is,  the  more  important 
it  is  to  support  it  by  artillery,  with  a  view  to 
its  preservation. 

It  is  essential,  also,  that  the  batteries  at- 
tached to  divisions  should  march  in  the 
front,  because  this  has  a  strong  influence  on 
the  morale  of  the  soldier.  He  attacks  always 
with  confidence  when  he  sees  the  flanks  of 
the  column  well  covered  with  cannon. 

The  artillery  reserve  should  be  kept  for  a 
decisive  moment,  and  then  employed  in  full 
force,  for  it  will  be  diflScult  for  the  enemy  at 
such  a  time  to  presume  to  attack  it. 

There  is  scarcely  an  instance  of  a  battery 
of  sixt^^  pieces  of  cannon  having  been  car- 


120  napoleon's 

ried  b}'  a  charge  of  infantry  or  cavalry, 
unless  where  it  was  entirely  without  sup- 
port, or  in  a  position  to  be  easily  turned. 


MAXI]>i   LIY. 

Artillery  should  always  be  placed  in 
tlie  most  advantageous  positions,  and  as 
far  in  front  of  the  line  of  cavalrv  and 
infantry  as  possible,  without  compromis- 
ing the  safety  of  the  guns. 

Field  batteries  should  command  the 
whole  country  round  from  the  level  of 
the  platform.  They  should  on  no  ac- 
count be  masked  on  the  right  and  left, 
but  have  free   range  in  every  direction. 

NOTE. 

The  battery  of  eighteen  pieces  of  cannon, 
which  covered  the  centre  of  the  Eussian 
army  at  the  battle  of  La  Moskwa  (Boro- 
dino), may  be  cited  as  an  example. 

Its  position,  upon  a  circular  height  which 
commanded  the  field  in  every  direction,  added 
so  powerfully  to  its  effect,  that  its  fire  alone 
sufficed,  for  a  considerable  time,  to  paralyze 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  121 

the  vigorous  iittack  made  by  tlic  French 
with  their  right.  Although  twice  broken, 
the  left  of  the  Russian  army  closed  to  this 
battery,  as  to  a  pivot,  and  twice  recovered 
its  former  position.  After  repeated  attacks, 
conducted  with  a  rare  intrepidity,  the  bat- 
tery was  at  length  carried  b}^  the  French, 
but  not  till  the}'  had  lost  the  élite  of  their 
army,  and  with  it  the  Generals  Caulincourt 
and  Montbrun.  Its  capture  decided  the  re- 
treat of  the  Ilussian  left. 

I  might  advert  likewise  to  another  in- 
stance, in  the  campaign  of  1809,  and  to  the 
terrible  effect  produced  by  the  hundred 
pieces  of  cannon  of  the  Guard  which  Gen- 
eral Lauriston  directed,  at  the  battle  of 
TVagram,  again!^t  the  right  of  the  Austrian 
army. 


MAXIM    LY. 

A  General  should  never  put  his  army 
into  cantonments,  when  he  has  the  means 
of  collecting  supplies  of  forage  and  pro- 
visions, and  of  thus  providing  for  the 
wants  of  the  soldier  in  the  field. 
11 


122  napoleon's 


NOTE. 

One  great  advantage  Avliieli  results  from 
having  an  arm^-  in  camp  is,  that  it  is  easier 
to  direct  its  spirit  and  maintain  its  discipline 
there.  The  soldier  in  cantonments  aban- 
dons himself  to  repose;  he  ends  b}^  finding  a 
pleasure  in  idleness,  and  in  fearing  to  return 
to  the  field.  The  reverse  takes  place  in  a 
camp.  There,  a  feeling  of  ennui,  and  a 
severer  discipline,  make  him  anxious  for  the 
opening  of  the  campaign,  to  interrupt  the 
nionoton}^  of  the  service  and  relieve  it  with 
the  chances  and  variety  of  war.  Besides,  an 
army  in  camp  is  much  more  secure  from  a 
surprise  than  in  cantonments — the  defect  of 
which  usually  consists  in  their  occupying  too 
great  an  extent  of  ground.  When  an  army 
is  obliged  to  go  into  quarters,  the  Marquis  de 
Peuquière  recommends  a  camp  to  be  selected 
in  front  of  the  line,  where  the  troops  can  be 
frequently  assembled — sometimes  suddenly, 
in  order  to  exercise  their  vigilance,  or  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  bringing  the  different 
corps  together. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  123 


MAXIM    LYI. 

A  good  general,  a  well-organized  sys- 
tem, good  instructions,  and  severe  disci- 
pline, aided  by  eôective  establishments, 
will  always  make  good  troops,  indepen- 
dently of  the  cause  for  which  they  fight. 

At  the  same  time,  a  love  of  country,  a 
spirit  of  enthusiasm,  a  sense  of  national 
honor,  and  fanaticism,  will  operate  upon 
young  soldiers  with  advantage. 

NOTE. 

This  remark  appears  to  me  less  applicable 
to  officers  than  to  soldiers,  for  as  war  is  not 
a  state  of  things  natural  to  man,  it  follows 
that  those  who  maintain  its  cause  musf  be 
governed  by  some  strong  excitement.  Much 
enthusiasm  and  devotedness  are  required  on 
the  part  of  the  troops  for  the  general  who 
commands,  to  induce  an  army  to  perform 
great  actions  in  a  war  in  wliich  it  takes 
no  interest.  This  is  sufficiently  proved  by 
the  npathy  of  auxiliaries,  unless  when  in- 
spired by  the  conduct  of  their  chief. 


124  napoleon's 

MAXIM    LYII. 

When  a  nation  is  without  establish- 
ments and  a  military  system,  it  is  very 
difficult  to  oro^anize  an  armv. 

NOTE. 

This  is  an  unanswerable  truth,  more  par- 
ticularly with  reference  to  an  army  intended 
to  act  upon  the  system  of  modern  war,  and 
in  which  order,  precision,  and  rapidity  of 
movement,  are  the  principal  essentials  to 
success. 


MAXIM     LYIII. 

The  first  qualification  of  a  soldier  is 
fortitude  under  fatigue  and  privation. 
Courage  is  only  the  second  ;  hardship, 
poverty  and  want,  are  the  best  school 
for  a  soldier. 

NOTE. 

Valor  belongs  to  the  young  soldier  as 
well  as  to  the  veteran;  but  in  the  former 
it  is  more  evanescent.     It  is  only  by  hab- 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  125 

its  of  service,  and  after  several  campaigns 
that  the  soldier  acquires  that  moral  courage 
which  makes  him  support  the  fotigues  and 
privations  of  war  without  a  murmur      Ex- 
perience by  this  time  has  instructed  him  to 
supply  his  own  wants.     He  is  satisfied  with 
what  he  can  procure,  because  he  knows  that 
success  is  only  to  be  obtained  by  fortitude 
and   perseverance.      Well   might   Nai^oleon 
fay   that   misery   and   want  were  the  best 
school  for  a  soldier;  for  as  nothing  could  be 
compared  with  the  total  destitution  of  the 
army   of  the   Alps,  when   he   assumed  the 
command,   so  nothing  could  equal  the  bril- 
liant success  which  he   obtained  with  this 
army  in  the  first  campaign  in  Italy      The 
conquerors  of  Montenotte,  Lodi,  Castiglione, 
Bassano,  Arcole  and  Rivoli  had  beheld   only 
a  few  months  before,  whole  battalions  cov- 
ered with  rags,  and  deserting  for  the  want 
of  subsistence. 


MAXIM    LIX. 

There  are  ûve  things  the  soldier  should 
never  be  without— his  musket,  his  am- 
munition,   his   knapsack,    his  provisions 


126  napoleon's  ' 

(for  at  leatst  four  days),  and  his  entreiich- 
ing-tool.  The  knapsack  may  be  reduced 
to  the  smallest  size  possible,  if  it  be 
thought  proper,  but  the  soldier  should 
always  have  it  with  him. 

NOTE. 

It  is  fortunate  that  Napoleon  has  recog- 
nized the  advantage  of  giving  to  every  sol- 
dier an  entrenchiug-tool.  His  authority  is 
the  best  answer  to  the  ridicule  which  has 
been  thrown  upon  those  who  proposed  it. 
An  axe  will  be  found  to  inconvenience  the 
foot-soldier  as  little  as  the  sword  he  wears 
at  his  side,  and  it  will  be  infinitely  more 
useful.  When  axes  are  given  out  to  compa- 
nies, or  are  carried  by  fatigue-men  during 
a  campaign,  they  are  soon  lost;  and  it 
often  happens,  when  a  camp  is  to  be  formed, 
that  a  difficulty  arises  in  cutting  wood  and 
building  huts  for  the  soldier;  whereas,  by 
making  the  axe  a  part  of  every  man's  ap- 
pointments, he  is  obliged  to  have  it  always 
with  him;  and  whether  the  object  be  to 
entrench  himself  in  a  village,  or  to  erect  huts 
in  a.  camp,  the  commander  of  a  corps  will 
speedily  see  the  advantage  of  this  innova- 
tion. 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  127 

When  once  the  axe  has  been  generally 
adopted,  we  shall,  perhaps,  see  the  desira- 
bility of  issuing  pickaxes  and  shovels  to 
particular  companies,  and  also  the  benefit  of 
more  frequent  entrenchments.  It  is  more 
particularly^  during  retreats  that  it  is  impor- 
tant to  entrench  when  the  army  has  reached 
a  good  position  ;  for  an  entrenched  camp 
not  only  furnishes  the  means  of  rallying 
troops  which  are  pursued,  but  if  it  be  forti- 
fied in  such  a  manner  as  to  render  the  issue 
of  an  attack  doubtful  to  the  enemy,  it  will 
not  only  sustain  the  morale  of  the  soldier  in 
the  retreat,  but  afford  the  general-in-chief 
opportunities  for  resuming  the  offensive,  and 
2)rofiting  by  the  first  false  movement  on  the 
part  of  his  adversary.  It  will  be  recollected 
how  Frederick,  in  the  campaign  of  1761, 
when  surrounded  by  two  Kussian  and  Aus- 
trian armies,  whose  united  force  was  quad- 
ruple his  own,  saved  his  army  by  entrench- 
ing himself  in  the  camp  of  Buntzalvitz. 


MAXIM    LX. 

Every  means  should  be  taken  to  attach 
the  soldier  to   his  colors.     This  is   best 


128  napoleon's 

accomplished  by  showing  consideration 
and  respect  to  the  old  soldier.  His  pay 
likewise  should  increase  with  his  leng-th 
of  service.  It  is  the  height  of  injustice 
not  to  pay  a  veteran  more  than  a  recruit. 

NOTE. 

Some  modern  writers  have  recommended, 
on  the  other  hand,  to  'limit  the  period  of 
service,  in  order  to  bring  the  whole  youth 
of  a  country  successively  under  arms.  By 
this  means  they  purpose  to  have  the  levies, 
en  masse,  all  ready  trained  and  capable  of 
resisting  successfully  a  war  of  invasion.  But 
however  advantageous  at  first  sight  such  a 
military  system  may  appear,  I  believe  it 
will  be  found  to  have  many  objections. 

In  the  first  place,  the  soldier  fatigued  with 
the  minutia3  of  discipHne  in  a  garrison,  will 
not  feel  much  inclined  to  re-enlist  after  he 
has  received  his  discharge,  more  especially 
since,  having  served  the  prescribed  time,  he 
will  consider  himself  to  have  fulfilled  ull  the 
duties  of  a  citizen  to  his  country.  Eeturn- 
ing  to  his  friends,  he  will  probably  marry, 
or  establish  himself  in  a  trade.  From  that 
moment  his  military  spirit  declines,  and  he 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  129 

soon  becomes  ill  îidapted  to  the  business  of 
war.  On  the  contrary,  the  soldier  who 
serves  long,  becomes  attached  to  his  regi- 
ment as  to  a  new  famil3^  He  submits  to 
the  yoke  of  discipline,  accustoms  himself  to 
the  2')rivations  his  situation  imposes,  and 
ends  by  finding  his  condition  agreeable. 
There  are  few  officers  that  have  seen  ser- 
vice who  have  not  discovered  the  difference 
between  old  and  young  soldiers,  with  refe- 
rence to  their  power  of  supporting  the 
fatigues  of  a  long  camj^aign,  to  the  deter- 
mined courage  that  characterizes  the  attack,  . 
or  to  the  ease  with  which  they  rally  after 
being  broken. 

Montécuculli  observes,  that  *'it  takes  time 
to  discipline  an  army;  more  to  inure  it  to 
war;  and  still  more  to  constitute  veterans." 
For  this  reason,  he  recommends  that  great  -»' 
consideration  should  be  shown  to  old  sol- 
diers ;  that  they  should  be  carefully  pro- 
vided for,  and  a  large  body  of  them  kept 
always  on  foot.  It  seems  to  me,  also,  that 
it  is  not  enough  to  increase  the  pay  of  the 
soldier  according  to  his  period  of  service, 
but  that  it  is  highly  essential  to  confer  on 
him  some  mark  of  distinction  that  shall 
secure  to  him  privileges  calculated  to    en- 


130  napoleon's 

courage    him    to   grow    gray   under    arms, 
and,  above  all,  to  do  so  with  honoi'. 


MAXIM    LXI. 

It  IS  not  set  speeches  at  the  moment  of 
battle  that  render  soldiers  brave.  The 
veteran  scarcely  listens  to  them,  and  the 
recruit  forgets  them  at  the  first  discharge. 
If  discourses  and  harangues  are  useful,  it 
is  during  the  campaign  :  to  do  away  un- 
favorable impressions,  to  correct  false 
reports,  to  keep  alive  a  proper  spirit  in 
the  camp,  and  to  furnish  materials  and 
amusement  for  the  bivouac.  All  printed 
orders  of  the  day  should  keep  in  view 
these  objects. 


NOTE 


The  opinion  of  the  genoral-in-chief,  ener- 
getically expressed,  is,  notwithstanding,  pro- 
ductive of  irreat  effect  on  the  morale  of  the 


soldier. 


In  1703,  at  the  attack  of  Horn  bee.  Mar- 
shal Yillars,  seeing  the  troops  advancing 
without  spirit,  threw  himself  at  their  head  : 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  131 

''What!"  said  he,  "is  it  expected  that  I,  a 
marshal  of  France,  should  be  the  first  to 
escalade,  when  I  order  you  to  attack  ?" 

These  few  words  rekindled  their  ardor; 
officers  and  soldiers  rushed  upon  the  works, 
and  the  town  was  taken  almost  without  loss. 

"We  have  retired  far  enough  for  to-day; 
you  know  I  always  sleep  upon  the  field  of 
battle!"  said  Napoleon,  as  he  flew  through 
the  ranks  at  the  moment  of  resuming  the 
offensive  at  Marengo.  These  few  words  suf- 
ficed to  revive  the  courage  of  the  soldiers, 
and  to  make  them  forget  the  fatigues  of  the 
day,  during  which  almost  every  man  had 
been  engaged. 


MAXIM    LXII. 

Tents  are  unfavorable  to  health.  The 
soldier  is  best  when  he  bivouacs,  because 
he  sleeps  with  his  feet  to  the  fire,  which 
speedily  dries  the  ground  on  which  he 
lies.  A  few  planks,  or  a  little  straw,  shel- 
ter him  from  the  wind. 

On  the  other  hand,  tents  are  necessary 
for  the  superior  officers,  who  have  to  write 
and  to  consult  their  maps.    Tents  should, 


132  napoleon's 

therefore,  be  issued  to  these,  with  direc- 
tions to  them  never  to  sleep  in  a  house. 
Tents  are  always  objects  of  observation 
to  the  enemy's  staff.  They  afford  infor- 
mation in  regard  to  your  numbers  and 
the  ground  you  occupy  ;  while  an  army 
bivouacking  in  two  or  three  lines,  is  only 
distinguishable  from  afar  by  the  smoke 
which  mingles  with  the  clouds.  It  is  im- 
possible to  count  the  number  of  the  fires. 

NOTE. 

The  acknowledged  advantage  of  bivouack- 
ing is  another  reason  for  adding  an  entrench- 
ing-tool  to  the  equipment  of  the  soldier;  for, 
with  the  assistance  of  the  axe  and  shovel, 
he  can  hut  himself  without  difficulty.  I  have 
seen  huts  erected  with  the  branches  of  trees, 
covered  with  turf,  where  the  soldier  was  per- 
fectly sheltered  from  the  cold  and  wet,  even 
in  the  worst  season.  ' 


MAXIM    LXIII. 

All  information  obtained  from  prison- 
ers should  be  received  with  caution,  and 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  133 

estimated  at  its  real  value.  A  soldier 
seldom  sees  anything  beyond  his  com- 
pany ;  and  an  officer  can  afford  intelli- 
gence of  little  more  than  the  position  and 
movements  of  the  division  to  which  his 
regiment  belongs.  On  this  account,  the 
general  of  an  army  should  never  depend 
upon  the  information  derived  from  pris- 
oners, unless  it  agrees  with  the  reports 
received  from  the  advanced  guards,  in 
reference  to  the  position,  etc.,  of  the 
enemy. 

NOTE. 

Montécuculh  wisely  observes  that  "pris- 
oners should  be  interrogated  separately,  in 
order  to  ascertain,  by  the  agreement  in  their 
answers,  how  far  they  may  be  endeavoring 
to  mislead  you/'  Generally  speaking,  the  in- 
formation required  from  officers  who  are  pris- 
oners, should  have  reference  to  the  strength 
and  resources  of  the  enemy,  and  sometimes 
to  his  localities  and  position.  Frederick  re- 
commends that  prisoners  should  be  menaced 
with  instant  death  if  they  are  found  at- 
tempting to  deceive  by  false  reports. 
12 


134  napoleon's 

MAXIM    LXIY. 

ITotliing  is  so  important  in  war  as  an 
undivided  command  ;  for  this  reason, 
when  war  is  carried  on  against  a  single 
power,  there  should  be  only  one  arm}^ 
acting  upon  one  base,  and  conducted  by 
one  chief. 

NOTE. 

"  Success,"  says  the  Archduke  Charles,  ^'  is 
only  to  be  obtained  by  simultaneous  eiforts, 
directed  upon  a  given  point,  sustained  with 
constancy,  and  executed  with  decision."  It 
rarely  happens  that  any  number  of  men 
who  desire  the  same  object  are  perfectly 
agreed  as  to  the  means  of  attaining  it;  and 
if  the  will  of  one  individual  is  not  allowed  to 
predominate,  there  can  be  no  ensemble  in  the 
execution  of  their  operations;  neither  will 
they  attain  the  end  proposed.  It  is  useless 
to  confirm  this  maxim  by  examples.  His- 
tory abounds  in  them. 

Prince  Eugene  and  Marlborough  would 
never  have  been  so  successful  in  the  cam- 
paigns which  they  directed  in  concert,  if  a 
sj^irit  of  intrigue  and  difference  of  opinion 
had  not  constantly  disorganized  the  armies 
opposed  to  them. 


MAXIMS   OP   WAR.  135 

MAXIM    LXY. 

The  same  consequences  which  have 
uniformly  attended  long  discussions  and 
councils  of  war,  will  follow  at  all  times. 
They  will  terminate  in  the  adoption  of  the 
worst  course,  which  in  war  is  always  the 
most  timid,  or,  if  you  will,  the  most  pru- 
dent. The  only  true  wisdom  in  a  general 
is  determined  courage. 

NOTE. 

Prince  Eugene  used  to  say  that  councils  of 
war  "  are  only  useful  Avhen  you  want  an 
excuse  for  attempting  nothing."  This  was 
also  the  opinion  of  Villars.  A  general-in- 
chief  should  avoid,  therefore,  assemblincr  a 
council  on  occasions  of  difficulty,  and  should 
confine  himself  to  consulting  separately  his 
most  experienced  generals  in  order  to  bene- 
fit by  their  advice,  while  he  is  governed  at 
the  same  time  in  his  decision  by  his  own 
judgment.  By  this  means,  he  becomes  re- 
sponsible, it  is  true,  for  the  measures  he 
pursues;  but  he  has  the  advantage  also  of 
acting  upon  his  own  conviction,  and  of  be- 


136  napoleon's 

ing  certain  that  the  secret  of  his  operations 
will  not  be  divulged,  as  is  usually  the  case 
where  it  is  discussed  by  a  council  of  war. 


MAXIM    LXYI. 

In  war,  the  general  alone  can  judge  of 
certain  arrangements.  It  depends  on  him 
alone  to  conquer  difficulties  by  his  own 
superior  talents  and  resolution. 

NOTE. 

The  officer  who  obeys,  whatever  may  be 
the  nature  or  extent  of  his  command,  will 
always  stand  excused  for  executing  implicit- 
ly the  orders  which  have  been  given  to  him. 
This  is  not  the  case  with  the  generai-in-chief, 
on  whom  the  eafety  of  the  army  and  the  suc- 
cess of  the  campaign  depend.  Occupied,  with- 
out intermission,  in  the  whole  process  of 
observation  and  reflection,  it  is  easy  to  con- 
ceive that  he  will  acquire  by  degrees  a 
solidity  of  judgment  which  will  enable  him 
to  see  things  in  a  clearer  and  more  enlarged 
point  of  view  than  his  inferior  generals. 

Marshal  Yillars,  in  his  campaigns,  acted 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  137 

almost  always  in  opposition  to  the  advice  of 
his  generals,  and  he  was  almost  always  fortu- 
nate. So  true  it  is,  tliat  a  general,  who  feels 
confident  in  his  talent  for  command,  must 
follow  the  dictates  of  his  own  genius  if  he 
wishes  to  achieve  success. 


MAXIM    LXYII. 

To  authorize  generals  or  other  officers 
to  lay  down  their  arms  in  virtue  of  a  par- 
ticular capitulation,  under  any  other  cir- 
cumstances than  when  they  are  composing 
the  garrison  of  a  fortress,  aflbrds  a  dan- 
gerous latitude.  It  is  destructive  of  all 
military  character  in  a  nation  to  open  such 
a  door  to  the  cowardly,  the  weak,  or  even 
to  the  misdirected  brave.  Great  extremi- 
ties require  extraordinary  resolution.  The 
more  obstinate  the  resistance  of  an  army, 
the  greater  the  chances  of  assistance  or  of 
success. 

How  man}^  seeming  impossibilities  have 
been  accomplished  by  men  W'hose  only 
resource  was  death  ! 


138  napoleon's 

NOTE. 

In  the  campaign  of  1759,  Frederick  di- 
rected General  Fink,  with  eighteen  thousand 
men,  upon  Maxen,  for  the  purpose  of  cutting 
oif  the  Austrian  army  from  the  defiles  of  Bo- 
hemia. Surrounded  by  twice  his  numbers. 
Fink  capitulated  after  a  sharp  action,  and 
fourteen  thousand  men  laid  down  their  arms. 
This  conduct  was  the  more  disgraceful,  be- 
cause General  Winch,  who  commanded  the 
cavalry,  cut  his  way  through  the  enemy. 
The  whole  blame  of  the  surrender  fell,  there- 
fore, upon  Fink,  who  was  tried  afterward  by 
a  court-martial,  and  sentenced  to  be  cashiered 
and  imprisoned  for  two  years. 

In  the  campaign  of  Italy  in  1796,  the  Aus- 
trian General  Provéra  capitulated  with  two 
thousand  men  in  the  castle  of  Cossaria.  Sub- 
sequently, at  the  battle  of  La  Favorite,  the 
same  general  capitulated  with  a  corps  of  six 
thousand  men.  I  scarcely  dare  to  revert  to 
the  shameful  defection  of  General  Mack  in 
the  capitulation  of  Ulm  in  1805,  where  thirty 
thousand  Austrians  laid  down  their  arms — 
when  we  have  seen,  during  the  wars  of  the 
Revolution,  so  many  generals  open  them- 
selves a  way  by  a  vigorous  .effort  through 
the  enemy,  supj^orted  only  by  a  few  battal- 
ions. 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  139 

MAXIM    LXVIII. 

There  is  no  security  for  any  sovereign, 
for  any  nation,  or  for  any  general,  if  offi- 
cers are  permitted  to  capitulate  in  the 
open  field,  and  to  lay  down  their  arms  in 
virtue  of  conditions  favorable  to  the  con- 
tracting party,  but  contrary  to  the  inter- 
ests of  the  army  at  large.  To  withdraw 
from  danger,  and  thereby  to  involve  their 
comrades  in  greater  peril,  is  the  height  of 
cowardice.  Such  conduct  should  be  pro- 
scribed, declared  infamous,  and  made  pun- 
ishable with  death.  All  generals,  officers 
and  soldiers,  who  capitulate  in  battle  to 
save  their  own  lives,  should  be  decimated. 

He  who  gives  the  order,  and  those  who 
obey,  are  alike  traitors,  and  deserve  capi- 
tal punishment. 

NOTE. 

Soldiers,  who  are  almost  alwa3^s  ignorant 
of  the  designs  of  their  chief,  cannot  be  re- 
sponsible for  his  conduct.  If  he  orders  them 
to  lay  down  their  arms,  they  must  do  so; 
otherwise  they  fail  in  that  law  of  discipline 


140  napoleon's 

which  is  more  essential  to  an  army  than 
thousands  of  men.  It  appears  to  me,  there- 
fore, under  these  circumstances,  that  the 
chiefs  alone  are  responsible,  and  liable  to  the 
punishment  due  to  their  cowardice.  We  have 
no  example  of  soldiers  being  wanting  in  their 
duty  in  the  most  desperate  situations,  where 
they  are  commanded  by  officers  of  approved 
resolution. 


MAXIM    LXIX. 

There  is  but  one  honorable  mode  of 
becoming  prisoner  of  war.  That  is,  by 
being  taken  separately;  by  which  is  meant, 
by  being  cut  off  entirely,  and  when  we 
can  no  longer  make  use  of  our  arras.  In* 
this  case,  there  can  be  no  conditions,  for 
honor  can  impose  none.  We  yield  to  an 
irresistible  necessity. 

NOTE. 

There  is  always  time  enough  to  surrender 
prisoner  of  war.  This  should  be  deferred, 
therefore,  till  the  last  extremity.  And  here 
I  may  be  permitted  to  cite  an  example  of 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  141 

rare  obstinacy  in   defence,  which  has  been 
related  to  me  by  ocular  witnesses.    The  cap- 
tain of  grenadiers,  Dubrenil,  of  the  thirty- 
seventh  regiment  of  the  line,  having  been 
sent  on  detachment  with  his  company,  was 
stopped  on  the  march  by  a  large  party  of 
Cossacks,  who  surrounded  him  on  every  side. 
Dubrenil  formed  his  little  force  into  square, 
and  endeavored  to  gain  the  skirts  of  a  wood 
(within   a   few   muskets'   shot   of  the   spot 
where  he  had  been  attacked),  and  reached 
it  with  very  little  loss.     But  as  soon  as  the 
grenadiers  saw  this  refuge  secured  to  them, 
they  broke  and  fled,  leaving  their  captain 
and  a  few  brave  men,  who  were  resolved  not 
to  abandon  him,  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy. 
In  the  meantime,  the  fugitives,  who  had  ral- 
lied in  the  depth  of  the  wood,  ashamed  of 
having  forsaken  their  leader,  came   to  the 
resolution  of  rescuing  him  from  the  enemy, 
if  a  prisoner,  or  of  carrying  off  his  body  if 
he  had  fallen.     With  this  view,  they  formed 
once  more  upon  the  outskirts,  and  opening 
a  passage  with  their  bayonets  through  the 
cavalry,  penetrated  to   their   captain,  who, 
notwithstanding  seventeen  wounds,  was  de- 
fending himself  still.    They  immediately  sur- 
rounded him,  and  regained  the  wood  with 


142  napoleon's 

little  loss.  Such  examples  are  not  rare  in 
the  wars  of  the  Eevolution,  and  it  were  de- 
sirable to  see  them  collected  by  some  con- 
temporary, that  soldiers  might  learn  how 
much  is  to  be  achieved  in  war  by  determined 
energy  and  sustained  resolution. 


MAXIM    LXX. 

The  conduct  of  a  general  in  a  conquer- 
ed country  is  full  of  difficulties.  If  severe, 
lie  irritates  and  increases  the  number  of 
his  enemies.  If  lenient,  he  gives  birth  to 
expectations  which  only  render  the  abuses 
and  vexations,  inseparable  from  war,  the 
more  intolerable.  A  victorious  general 
must  know  how  to  employ  severity,  justice 
and  mildness  by  turns,  if  he  would' allay 
sedition  or  prevent  it. 

NOTE. 

Among  the  Eomans,  generals  were  only 
permitted  to  ari'ive  at  the  command  of  arm- 
ies after  having  exercised  the  different  func- 
tions of  the  magistracy.  Thus  by  a  previous 
knowledge  of  administration,  they  were  pre- 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  143 

pared  to  govern  the  conquered  provinces 
with  all  that  discretion  which  a  newly-ac- 
quired power,  supported  by  arbitrary  force, 
demands. 

In  the  military  institutions  of  modern 
times,  the  generals,  instructed  only  in  what 
concerns  the  operation  of  strategy  and  tac- 
tics, are  obliged  to  intrust  the  civil  depart- 
ments of  the  war  to  inferior  agents,  who, 
without  belonging  to  the  army,  render  all 
those  abuses  and  vexations,  inseparable  from 
its  operations,  still  more  intolerable. 

This  observation,  which  I  do  little  more 
than  repeat,  seems  to  me,  notwithstanding, 
deserving  of  particular  attention  ;  for  if  the 
leisure  of  general  officers  was  directed  in 
time  of  peace  to  the  study  of  diplomacy — if 
they  were  employed  in  the  different  embas- 
sies which  sovereigns  send  to  foreign  courts 
— they  would  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the 
laws  and  of  the  government  of  these  coun- 
tries, in  which  they  may  be  called  hereafter 
to  carry  on  the  war.  They  would  learn  also 
to  distinguish  those  points  of  interest  on 
which  all  treaties  must  be  based,  which  have 
for  their  object  the  advantageous  termina- 
tion of  a  campaign.  By  the  aid  of  this 
information  they  would  obtain  certain  and 


144  napoleon's 

positive  results,  since  all  the  springs  of  ac- 
tion, as  well  as  the  machinery  of  war,  would 
be  in  their  hands.  We  have  seen  Prince 
Eugene,  and  Marshal  Yillars,  each  fulfilling 
with  equal  ability  the  duties  of  a  general 
and  a  negotiator. 

When  an  army  which  occupies  a  conquered 
province  observes  strict  discipline,  there  are 
few  examples  of  insurrection  among  the  peo- 
ple, unless  indeed  resistance  is  provoked  (as 
but  too  often  happens),  by  the  exactions  of 
inferior  agents  employed  in  the  civil  admin- 
istration. 

It  is  to  this  point,  therefore,  that  the  gen- 
eral-inrchief  should  principally  direct  his 
attention,  in  order  that  the  contributions 
imposed  by  the  wants  of  the  army  may  be 
levied  with  impartiality  ;  and  above  all,  that 
they  may  be  applied  to  their  true  object,  in- 
stead of  serving  to  enrich  the  collectors,  as 
is  ordinarily  the  case. 


MAXIM    LXXI. 

î^othing  can  excuse  a  general  who 
takes  advantage  of  the  knowledge  ac- 
quired in  the  service  of  his  country,  to 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  145 

deliver  up  her  frontier  and  her  towns  to 
foreigners.  This  is  a  crime  reprobated 
by  every  principle  of  religion,  morality 
and  honor. 

NOTE. 

Ambitious  men  who,  listening  only  to  ♦ 
their  passions,  arm  natives  of  the  same  land 
against  each  other  (under  the  deceitful  pre- 
text of  the  public  good),  are  still  more  crim- 
inal. For  however  arbitrary  a  government, 
the  institutions  which  have  been  consolida- 
ted by  time,  are  always  preferable  to  civil 
war,  and  to  that  anarchy  which  the  latter  is 
obliged  to  create  for  the  justification  of  its 
crimes. 

To  be  faithful  to  his  sovereign,  and  to 
respect  the  established  government,  are  the 
first  principles  which  ought  to  distinguish  a 
soldier  and  a  man  of  honor. 


MA*XIM    LXXII. 

A  general-in-cliief  has  no  right  to  shel- 
ter his  mistakes  in  war  under  cover  of  his 
sovereign,   or  of  a  minister,  when  these 
are  both  distant  from  the  scene  of  opera- 
13 


146  napoleon's 

tien,  and  must  consequently  be  either  ill 
informed  or  wholly  ignorant  of  the  actual 
state  of  things. 

Hence,  it  follows,  that  every  general  is 
culpable  who  undertakes  the  execution  of 
^a  plan  which  he  considers  faulty.  It  is 
his  duty  to  represent  his  reasons,  to  insist 
upon  a  change  of  plan,  in  short,  to  give 
in  his  resignation,  rather  than  allow  him- 
self to  be  made  the  instrument  of  his 
army's  ruin.  Every  general-in-chief  who 
fights  a  battle  in  consequence  of  superior 
orders,  with  the  certainty  of  losing  it,  is 
equally  blâmable. 

In  this  last-mentioned  case,  the  general 
ought  to  refuse  obedience  ;  because  a 
blind  obedience  is  due  only  to  a  military 
command  given  by  a  superior  present  on 
the  spot  at  the  moment  of  action.  Being 
in  possession  of  the  real  state  of  things, 
the  superior  has  it  then  in  his  power  to 
afford  the  necessary  explanations  to  the 
person  who  executes  his  orders. 

But  supposing  a  general-in-chief  to  re- 
ceive positive  order  from  his  sovereign, 
directing  him  to  fight  a  battle,  with  the 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  147 

further  injunction,  to  yield  to  his  adver- 
sary, and  allow  himself  to  he  defeated — 
ought  he  to  obey  it  ?  'No.  If  the  general 
should  he  able  to  comprehend  the  mean- 
ing or  utility  of  such  an  order,  he  should 
execute  it  ;  otherwise  he  should  refuse  to 
obey  it. 

NOTE. 

In  the  campaign  of  1697,  Prince  Eugene 
caused  the  courier  to  be  intercepted,  who 
was  bringing  him  orders  from  the  emperor 
forbidding  him  to  hazard  a  battle,  for  which 
everything  had  been  prepared,  and  which 
he  foresaw  would  prove  decisive.  He  con- 
sidered, therefore,  that  he  did  his  duty  in 
evading  the  orders  of  his  sovereign  ;  and  the 
victory  of  Zanta,  in  which  the  Turks  lost 
about  thirty  thousand  men,  and  four  thou- 
sand prisoners,  rewarded  his  audacity.  In 
the  meantime,  notwithstanding  the  immense 
advantages  which  accrued  from  this  victory 
to  the  imperial  arms,  Eugene  was  disgraced 
on  his  arrival  at  Yienna. 

In  1793,  General  Hoche,  having  received 
orders  to  move  upon  Treves  with  an  army 
harassed  by  constant  marches  in  a  moun- 
tainous   and    difficult   country,  refused     to 


148  napoleon's 

obey.  He  observed,  with  reason,  that  in  or- 
der to  obtain  possession  of  an  unimportant 
fortress,  they  were  exposing  his  army  to 
inevitable  ruin.  He  caused,  tberefore,  his 
troops  to  return  into  winter  quarters,  and 
preferred  the  preservation  of  his  army,  upon 
which  the  success  of  the  future  campaign 
depended,  to  his  own  safety.  Eecalled  to 
Paris,  he  was  thrown  into  a  dungeon,  wliich 
he  only  quitted  on  the  downfall  of  Eobe- 
spierre. 

I  dare  not  decide  if  such  examples  are  to 
be  imitated  ;  but  it  seems  to  me  highly  de- 
sirable that  a  question  so  new  and  so  impor- 
tant, should  be  discussed  by  men  who  are 
capable  of  determining  its  merits. 


MAXIM    LXXIII. 

The  first  qualification  in  a  general-in- 
chief  is  a  cool  head — that  is,  a  head  which 
receives  just  impressions,  and  estimates 
things  and  objects  at  their  real  value. 
He  must  not  allow  himself  to  be  elated 
by  good  news,  or  depressed  by  bad. 

The  impressions  he  receives  either  sue- 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  149 

cessively  or  simultaneously  in  the  course 
of  the  day,  should  be  so  classed  as  to 
take  up  only  the  exact  place  in  his  mind 
which  they  deserve  to  occupy  ;  since  it  is 
upon  a  just  comparison  and  consideration 
of  the  weight  due  to  different  impres- 
sions, that  the  power  of  reasoning  and  of 
right  judgment  depends. 

Some  men  are  so  physically  and  mor- 
ally constituted  as  to  see  everything 
through  a  highly-colored  medium.  They 
raise  up  a  picture  in  the  mind  on  every 
slight  occasion,  and  give  to  every  triv- 
ial occurrence  a  dramatic  interest.  But 
whatever  knowledge,  or  talent,  or  cour- 
age, or  other  good  qualities  such  men 
may  possess,  nature  has  not  formed  them 
for  the  command  of  armies,  or  the  direc- 
tion of  great  military  operations. 

NOTE. 

<'  The  first  quality  in  a  general-in-chief," 
says  Montéciiculli,  "  is  a  great  knowledge 
of  the  art  of  war.  This  is  not  intuitive, 
but  the  result  of  experience.  A  man  is  not 
born  a  commander.  He  must  become  one. 
13* 


150 


NAPOLEON  s 


Not  to  be  anxious  ;  to  be  always  cool  ;  to 
avoid  confusion  in  his  commands;  never  to 
change  countenance;  to  give  his  orders  in 
the  midst  of  battle  with  as  much  composure 
as  if  he  were  perfectly  at  ease.  These  are 
the  proofs  of  valor  in  a  general. 

''  To  encourage  the  timid  ;  to  increase  the 
number  of  the  truly  brave  ;  to  revive  the 
drooping  ardor  of  the  troops  in  battle  ;  to 
rally  those  who  are  broken  ;  to  bring  back 
to  the  charge  those  who  are  repulsed;  to 
find  resources  in  difficulty,  and  success  even 
amid  disaster;  to  be  ready  at  a  moment  to 
devote  himself,  if  necessary,  for  the  welfare 
of  the  state.  These  are  the  actions  which 
acquire  for  a  general  distinction  and  re- 
nown." 

To  this  enumeration  may  be  added,  the 
talent  of  discriminating  character,  and  of 
employing  every  man  in  the  particular  post 
which  nature  has  qualified  him  to  fill.  "My 
principal  attention,"  said  Marshal  Villars, 
"  was  alwaj^s  directed  to  the  study  of  the 
younger  generals.  Such  a  one  I  found,  by 
the  boldness  of  his  character,  fit  to  lead  a 
column  of  attack  ;  another,  from  a  disposi- 
tion naturally  cautious,  but  without  being 
deficient  in   courage,  more  perfectly  to  be 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  151 

relied  on  for  the  defence  of  a  country."  It 
is  only  by  a  just  application  of  these  per- 
sonal qualities  to  their  respective  objects, 
that  it  is  possible  to  command  success  in 
war. 


MAXIM    LXXIV. 

The  leading  qualifications  which  should 
distinguish  an  officer  selected  for  the 
head  of  the  staff,  are,  to  know  the  coun- 
try thoroughly  ;  to  be  able  to  conduct  a 
reconnoissance  with  skill  ;  to  superintend 
the  transmission  of  orders  promptly  ;  to 
lay  down  the  most  complicated  move- 
ments intelligibly,  but  in  a  few  words, 
and  with  simplicity. 

NOTE. 

Formerly,  the  duties  of  the  chiefs  of  the 
staff  were  confined  to  the  necessary  prepa- 
rations for  carrying  the  plan  of  the  cam- 
paign, and  the  operations  resolved  on  by 
the  general-in-chief,  into  effect.  In  a  battle, 
they  were  only  employed  in  directing  move- 
ments and  superintending  their  execution. 


152  napoleon's 

But  in  the  late  wars,  the  offieera  of  the  staff 
were  frequently  intrusted  with  the  command 
of  a  column  of  attack,  or  of  large  detach- 
ments, when  the  general-in-chief  feared  to 
disclose  the  secret  of  his  plans  by  the  trans- 
mission of  orders  or  instructions.  Great 
advantages  have  resulted  from  this  innova- 
tion, although  it  was  long  resisted.  By  this 
means,  the  staff  have  been  enabled  to  per- 
fect their  theory  by  practice,  and  they  have 
acquired,  moreover,  the  esteem  of  the  sol- 
diers and  junior  oflâcers  of  the  line,  who  are 
easily  led  to  think  lightly  of  their  superiors, 
whom  they  do  not  see  fighting  in  the  ranks. 
The  generals  Avho  have  held  the  arduous 
situation  of  chief  of  the  staff  during  the 
wars  of  the  Eevolution,  have  almost  always 
been  employed  in  the  different  branches  of 
the  profession.  Marshal  Berthier,  who  filled 
so  conspicuously^  this  appointment  to  Kapo- 
leon,  was  distinguished  by  all  the  essentials 
of  a  general.  He  possessed  calm,  and  at 
the  same  time  brilliant  courage,  excellent 
judgment,  and  approved  experience.  He 
bore  arms  during  half  a  century,  made  war 
in  the  four  quarters  of  the  globe,  opened 
and  terminated  thirty-two  campaigns.  In 
his  youth  he  acquired,  under  the  eye  of  his 


MAXIMS   or   WAR.  15o 

father,  who  was  an  engineer  officer,  the  tal- 
ent of  tracing  phxns  and  finishing  them  with 
exactness,  as  well  as  the  preliminary  quali- 
fications necessary  to  form  a  staff-officer. 
Admitted  by  the  Prince  de  Lambesq  into 
his  regiment  of  dragoons,  he  was  taught 
the  skilful  management  of  his  horse  and  his 
sword — accomplishments  so  important  to  a 
soldier.  Attached  afterward  to  the  staff  of 
Count  Eochambeau,  he  made  his  first  cam- 
paign in  America,  where  he  soon  began  to 
distinguish  himself  by  his  valor,  activity 
and  talents.  Having  at  length  attained 
superior  rank  in  the  staff-corps  formed  by 
Marshal  de  Segur,  he  visited  the  camps  of 
the  King  of  Prussia,  and  discharged  the  du- 
ties of  chief  of  the  staff'  under  the  Baron 
de  Bezenval. 

During  nineteen  years,  consumed  in  six- 
teen campaigns,  the  history  of  Marshal  Bcr- 
thier's  life  was  little  else  but  that  of  the 
w\ars  of  Napoleon,  all  the  details  of  which  he 
directed,  both  in  the  cabinet  and  the  field. 
A  stranger  to  the  intrigues  of  politics,  he 
labored  with  indefatigable  activity;  seized 
with  promptitude  and  sagacity  upon  general 
views,  and  gave  the  necessary  orders  for 
attaining  them  with  prudence,  perspicuity, 
13** 


154  napoleon's 

and  conciseness.  Discreet,  impenetrable, 
modest;  he  was  just,  exact,  and  even  se- 
vere, in  everything  that  regarded  the  ser- 
vice; but  he  always  set  an  example  of 
vigilance  and  zeal  in  his  own  person,  and 
knew  how  to  maintain  discipline,  and  to 
cause  his  authority  to  be  respected  by  every 
rank  under  his  orders. 


MAXIM    LXXV. 

A  coramandant  of  artillery  should  un- 
derstand well  the  general  principles  of 
each  branch  of  the  service,  since  he  is 
called  upon  to  supply  arms  and  ammu- 
nition to  the  difterent  corjDS  of  which  it  is 
composed.  His  correspondence  wnth  the 
commanding  officers  of  artillery  at  the 
advanced  posts,  should  put  him  in  pos- 
session of  all  the  movements  of  the  army, 
and  the  disposition  and  management  of 
the  great  park  of  artillery  should  depend 
upon  this  information. 

NOTE. 

After  having  recognized  the  advantage  of 
intrusting  tlie  supply  of  arms  and  ammuni- 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR.  155 

tion  for  an  army  to  a  military  body,  it 
appears  to  me  extraordinary  that  the  same 
regulation  does  not  extend  to  that  of  pro- 
visions and  forage,  instead  of  leaving  it  in 
the  hands  of  a  separate  administration,  as  is 
the  practice  at  present. 

The  civil  establishments  attached  to  ar- 
mies are  formed  almost  always  at  the  com- 
mencement of  a  war,  and  composed  of  per- 
sons strangers  to  those  laws  of  discipline 
which  they  are  but  too  much  inclined  to 
disregard.  These  men  are  little  esteemed 
by  the  military,  because  they  serve  only  to 
enrich  themselves,  without  respect  to  the 
means.  They  consider  only  their  private 
interest  in  a  service  whose  glory  they  can- 
not share,  although  some  portion  of  its  suc- 
cess depends  upon  their  zeal.  The  disorders 
and  defalcations  incident  to  these  establish- 
ments would  assuredly  cease,  if  they  were 
confided  to  men  who  had  been  employed  in 
the  army,  and  who,  in  return  for  their  la- 
bors, were  permitted  to  partake  with  their 
fellow-soldiers  the  triumph  of  their  success. 


156  napoleon's 

MAXIM    LXXVI. 

The  qualities  which  distinguish  a  good 
general  of  advanced  posts,  are,  to  recon- 
noitre accurately  deiiles  and  fords  of  every 
description;  to  provide  guides  that  may 
be  depended  on  ;  to  interrogate  the  curé 
and  postmaster  ;  to  establish  rapidly  a 
good  understanding  with  the  inhabitants; 
to  send  out  spies  ;  to  intercept  public  and 
private  letters;  to  translate  and  analyze 
their  contents;  in  a  word,  to  be  able  to 
answer  every  question  of  the  general-in- 
chief,  when  he  arrives  with  the  whole 
army . 

NOTE. 

Foraging  parties,  composed  of  small  de- 
tachments, and  which  were  usually  intrusted 
to  young  officers,  served  formerly  to  make 
good  officers  of  advanced  posts;  but  now  the 
arm}^  is  suppHed  with  provisions  by  regular 
contributions:  it  is  only  in  a  course  of  par- 
tisan warfare  that  the  necessary  experience 
can  be  acquired  to  fill  these  situations  with 
success. 

A  chief  of  partisans  is,  to  a  certain  ex- 


MAXIMS    OF    WAR. 


157 


tent,  independent  of  the  army.  He  receives 
neither  pay  nor  provisions  from  it,  and 
rarely  succor,  and  is  abandoned  during  the 
whole  campaign  to  his  own  resources. 

An  officer  so  circumstanced  must  unite 
address  with  courage,  and  boldness  with 
discretion,  if  he  wishes  to  collect  plunder 
w^ithout  measuring  the  strength  of  his  little 
corps  Avith  superior  forces.  Always  ha- 
rassed, always  surrounded  by  dangers,  which 
it  is  his  business  to  foresee  and  surmount,  a 
leader  of  partisans  acquires  in  a  short  time 
an  experience  in  the  details  of  war  rarely  to 
be  obtained  by  an  officer  of  thelinej  because 
the  latter  is  almost  always  under  the  guid- 
ance of  superior  authority,  which  directs 
the  whole  of  his  movements,  while  the  talent 
and  genius  of  the  partisan  arc  developed 
and  sustained  by  a  dependence  on  his  own 
resources. 


MAXIM    LXXVII. 

Geuerals-in-chief  must  be  guided  by 
their  own  experience,  or  their  genius. 
Tactics,  evolutions,  the  duties  and  knowl- 
edge of  an  engineer  or  artillery  officer, 


1^  napoleon's 

may  be  learned  in  treatises,  but  the 
science  of  strategy  is  only  to  be  acquired 
by  "experience,  and  by  studying  tlie  cam- 
paigns of  all  the  great  captains. 

Gustavus  Adolphus,  Turenne,  and  Fred- 
erick, as  well  as  Alexander,  Hannibal,  and 
Csesar,  have  all  acted  upon  the  same  prin- 
ciples. These  have  been  :  to  keep  .their 
forces  united  ;  to  leave  no  weak  part 
unguarded;  to  seize  with  rapidity  on 
important  points. 

Such  are  the  principles  which  lead  to 
victory,  and  which,  by  inspiring  terror  at 
the  reputation  of  your  arms,  will  at  once 
maintain  fidelity  and  secure  subjection. 

NOTE. 

"î^  great  captain  can  only  be  formed," 
says  the  Archduke  Charles,  '^  by  long  expe- 
rience and  intense  study  :  neither  is  his  own 
experience  enough — for  whose  life  is  there 
sufficiently  fruitful  of  events  to  render  his 
knowledge  universal  ?"  It  is,  therefore,  by 
augmenting:  his  information  from  the  stock 
of  others,  by  appreciating  justly  the  discov- 
eries of  his  predecessors,  and  by  taking  for 
his  standard  of  comparison  those  great  mili- 


MAXIMS    OF   WAR.  ^  ^        lA 

tary  exploits,  in  connection  with  their  poli- 
tical results,  in  which  the  history  of  war 
abounds,  that  he  can  alone  become  a  great 
comni^mder.  % 


MAXIM    LXXVIII. 

Peruse  again  and  again  the  campaigns 
of'Alexander,  Hannibal,  Cî^esar,  Çriistavus 
Adolphus,  Turenne,fc  Eugene,  and  Freder- 
ick. Model  yourself  upon  them.  This 
is  the  only,  means  of  becoming  a  great 
captain,  and  of  acquiring  the  secret  of  the 
art  of  war.  Your  own  genius  will  be 
enlightened  and  improved  by  this  study, 
and  you  will  learn  to  reject  all  maxims 
foreign  to  the  principles  of  these  great 
commanders. 

NOTE. 

It  is  in  order  to  facilitate  this  object  that 
I  have  formed  the  present  collection.  It  is 
after  reading  and  meditating  upon  the  his- 
tory of  modern  war  that  I  have  endeavored 
to  illustrate,  by  examples,  how  the  maxims 
of  a  great  captain  may  be  most  successfully 
applied  to  this  study.  May  the  end  I  have 
had  in  view  be  accomplished  ! 


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